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Tamir Moustafa, “Constituting Religion – An Introduction” 
 
Most Muslim-majority countries have legal systems that are meant to embed religion in 
state law. In many cases, the broad outlines of these legal frameworks are an enduring 
legacy of colonialism. In others, state regulation of religion is of more recent vintage. But 
in either instance, the co-constitution of law and religion is a trend that is not likely to end 
anytime soon. Take, for example, the fact that all the constitutions written in Muslim-
majority countries since the turn of the millennium declare Islam the religion of the state. 
Or, consider the fact that personal status and family law frameworks are typically 
regulated along religious lines. 
These sorts of legal arrangements are not unique to Muslim-majority countries, but as a 
group they tend to regulate religion far more than the global average. Among the twenty-
three countries in the “very high” category of the Pew Government Restrictions on 
Religion Index, eighteen (78 percent) are Muslim-majority countries. This oversized 
share compares with only two of eighty-eight countries (2.3 percent) in the “low” 
category of the Index. Whether by way of constitutional proclamations or substantive 
laws, the leaders of most Muslim-majority states endeavor to “constitute” religion by way 
of state law.  
At the same time, these legal systems typically contain provisions that one expects to see 
in a liberal legal order, including constitutional guarantees for civil liberties, religious 
freedom, and equal rights before the law. These dual commitments to religion and liberal 
rights are not inherently at odds. Nonetheless, they generate legal questions, present legal 
conundrums, and afford legal and symbolic resources for those who wish to advance 
contending visions for their states and societies.  
Constituting Religion examines these issues through an in-depth treatment of the 
Malaysian case. I focus on Malaysia for three reasons. First, Malaysia is home to one of 
the most tightly regulated religious spheres in the world. It therefore provides a textbook 
example of how many Muslim-majority states have sought to define and regulate religion 
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through state law. Second, Malaysia provides a striking example of how, under certain 
conditions, efforts to constitute religion catalyze the “judicialization of religion,” a 
circumstance wherein courts are made to adjudicate questions and controversies touching 
on religion. Finally, the Malaysian case provides a vibrant example of how judicialization 
can (re)constitute religion and liberal rights as binary opposites in the public imagination. 
Here, I examine the radiating effects of courts on popular religious consciousness.  
*   *   * 
Long defined by its ethnic cleavages, Malaysian politics is increasingly polarized around 
religious difference. This polarization is in no small part due to a recent series of high-
profile cases concerning the jurisdiction of the federal civil courts vis-à-vis state-level 
syariah courts. The cases carried significant legal implications, but their collective impact 
was felt most strongly in the court of public opinion. The cases generated a flood of 
media attention and they became focal points for political mobilization outside of the 
courts. Constituting Religion examines the institutional origins of these cases and traces 
their radiating effects on Malaysian political life.  
Shamala v. Jeyaganesh is among the dozens of cases examined in the book. It provides a 
striking example of how legal controversies that are ostensibly about religion are better 
understood as pathologies of state law. The case concerned a Hindu couple who had 
married under the Marriage and Divorce Act, the statute that regulates non-Muslim 
marriages in Malaysia. A few years into the marriage, the husband, Jeyaganesh, left 
Shamala and converted to Islam. As a Muslim, he was now subject to the jurisdiction of 
the syariah courts. As a non-Muslim, Shamala remained subject to the jurisdiction of the 
civil courts. Each managed to secure interim custody orders for their two young children 
from these two different jurisdictions, but the court orders came to opposite conclusions: 
the Syariah court awarded custody of the children to Jeyaganesh, while the civil court 
awarded custody to Shamala. To make matters worse, because official religious status 
determines which court one can access, neither parent could directly contest the 
competing court order. This absurd situation was the beginning of an epic legal battle that 
remained in the courts—and in the press—for years. The case turned on technical issues 
of court jurisdiction, rules of standing, and other features of Malaysian judicial process. 
But they were widely understood by the public as a zero-sum conflict between religious 
law and secular law. 
As a direct result of Shamala v. Jeyaganesh, liberal rights groups formed a coalition to 
“ensure that Malaysia does not become a theocratic state.” Not long after, a broad array 
of over fifty conservative NGOs united in a countervailing coalition calling itself Muslim 
Organizations for the Defense of Islam (Pertubuhan-Pertubuhan Pembela Islam). 
Pembela announced that it was mobilizing to defend “the position of Islam in the 
Constitution and the legal system of this country.” Both coalitions worked tirelessly to 
lobby the government and to shape public understanding of what was at stake in Shamala 
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v. Jeyaganesh and dozens of other cases. The two sides found agreement only in the 
proposition that Malaysia faced a stark choice between secularism and Islam, between 
rights and rites. 
Constituting Religion traces the work of activists in the court of law (litigation, 
submission of amicus curiae briefs) and in the court of public opinion (impromptu 
statements on courthouse steps, press conferences at NGO headquarters, petitions, digital 
advocacy campaigns, public rallies, vigils, and more). Given that court cases typically 
involve multiple hearings and appeals, a single case can generate a continuous stream of 
press coverage for upwards of a decade. For instance, Indira Gandhi v. Muhammad 
Ridzuan Abdullah is a child custody/conversion dispute that first went to court when I 
began fieldwork for this project in 2009. By the time Constituting Religion went to press, 
the case had produced eighteen separate court decisions and thirty-five “newsworthy” 
court appearances. The case finally concluded a decade later (yet Indira is still not 
reunited with her daughter). Along the way, each hearing was covered as a distinct media 
event—the next installment in a politically charged and emotive drama. With each court 
decision, dozens of NGOs mobilized on opposite sides of a “rights-versus-rites binary.” 
Constituting Religion examines how, through these mobilizations, each side derived 
legitimacy, purpose, and power from an oppositional stance vis-à-vis the other. Liberal 
rights activists rallied supporters by sounding the alarm that secularism was under siege 
and that Malaysia was on the way to becoming an Islamic state. On the other side, 
conservative organizations rallied support by contending that liberal rights groups wished 
to undermine the autonomy of the syariah courts and that they worked in cooperation 
with foreign interests intent on weakening Islam. Both groups maintained that Islamic 
law and liberal rights were incompatible and that Malaysians must stand for one or the 
other. These efforts worked to (re)constitute popular understandings of Islam, liberal 
rights, and their imagined relationship to one another in starkly adversarial terms. 
A remarkable aspect of all this mobilization is that the cases provided a prominent 
platform for a variety of actors with little or no expertise in matters of religion. 
Constituting Religion traces the claims and counter-claims that were fielded by litigants, 
lawyers, judges, journalists, political parties, NGOs, and government officials. Most of 
these actors had no specialized knowledge of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) or usul al-fiqh 
(Islamic legal theory). And yet judicialization positioned them as central agents in the 
production of new religious knowledge – displacing, or at least competing alongside 
“traditional” religious authorities. What is striking in the Malaysian case is that most of 
these actors defined Islam vis-à-vis liberalism, or, more to the point, against liberalism.  
*   *   * 
In Malaysia and elsewhere, courts often stand at the center of heated debates involving 
religion. Conventional accounts tend to frame these legal struggles as the product of a 
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collision between ascendant religious movements and liberal legal orders. In other words, 
legal conflict is understood as originating from outside the legal system. This 
understanding of the root problem (religion) and what is at stake (liberty) comes easily 
because it aligns with the prevailing notion that courts are in the business of conflict 
resolution and courts serve as defenders of fundamental liberties and strongholds of 
secularism.  
In contrast with this expectation, Constituting Religion shows that, far from consistently 
resolving disputes, legal institutions can generate conflict and exacerbate ideological 
polarization. Explanations that start and end with the “problem” of religion, without 
examining the intervening work of law and courts, will fail to appreciate these conflict-
generative functions. And simplified explanations that lay blame on a reified “religion” 
will also fail to grasp the myriad ways that the state is itself implicated in the politics of 
religion and in modern constructions of religion more generally. Law and courts do not 
simply stand above religion and politics. Instead, they enable and catalyze ideological 
conflict. 
Constituting Religion builds on recent and foundational scholarship concerned with legal 
mobilization, legal consciousness, legal pluralism, social movements, political Islamism, 
and the genealogies of secularism. As a result, the book draws on diverse approaches 
from sociolegal studies, religious studies, comparative judicial politics, and religion and 
politics. Each of these literatures and approaches is rich with insights, yet some of these 
bodies of scholarship are not in conversation nearly as much as they could be.  
The focus on legal institutions and their role in the judicialization of religion is not meant 
to minimize the ideological cleavages that have gripped many Muslim-majority countries 
over the place of religion in the legal and political order. But one of the goals of 
Constituting Religion is to better understand the role of modern law in fueling those 
struggles. In other words, an important objective of the book is to make visible the role of 
law and courts in helping to constitute the very ideological conflicts that courts are 
charged with resolving. This aim encourages reflection on deeply held assumptions about 
religion as a perennial troublemaker and deeply rooted expectations about the normative 
role of law vis-à-vis religion.  
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Asli Bali, “Liberal Rights and Religious Rights” 
 
How do Muslim-majority countries manage dual commitments to constitutional 
protections for liberal rights and Islamic personal status law? Tamir Moustafa offers a 
rich and nuanced study of the Malaysian case to address this question in that context and 
develop broader insights. Focusing on the roles played by courts and lawyers in 
producing a popular understanding of an opposition between liberal rights and religious 
provisions or, as Moustafa helpfully frames it, a “rights-versus-rites binary,” he provides 
a deeply textured account of how and why legal institutions play a role in bringing these 
commitments into conflict. Moustafa notes that in many Muslim-majority contexts, 
courts increasingly adjudicate questions and controversies over religion, which he calls 
the “judicialization of religion.” In cases where courts play a preeminent role in 
determining how the state regulates religion, he argues that legal institutions serve to 
constitute the struggle over religion rather than merely offering a forum for dispute 
resolution.  
While Constituting Religion provides a detailed case study of Malaysia, the argument 
Moustafa develops has important implications for much of the Muslim world. There is an 
extensive literature across disciplines—from comparative law to political science to 
sociology of religion—making the case that there is no intrinsic conflict between Islam 
and liberal rights protections (and more broadly Islam and democracy). While Moustafa 
agrees with this, in practice he notes that the constitutional and legal controversies that 
have roiled the Muslim-majority world from Egypt to Pakistan have often centered on 
tensions between secular and religious interpretations of rights. His close reading of such 
controversies in the Malaysian context builds a theory about the role of courts as a focal 
point for social movements, legal mobilizations, and contestations over religion that has 
applicability beyond Malaysia. 
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Moustafa’s argument concerning the judicialization of religion is an important 
counterpoint to recent scholarship arguing that courts play a moderating role in countries 
where a trend of greater religiosity has put pressure on liberal constitutional 
commitments. Ran Hirschl has argued that in countries with a dual commitment to 
religion as a/the source of legislation and modern constitutionalism as a guarantor of 
individual rights, constitutional courts serve as a moderating force that helps constrain 
religious claims in the legal domain. But many of the countries of interest to Hirschl have 
systems of legal pluralism that accord religious courts jurisdiction over what are 
considered personal status or family law cases. As Moustafa demonstrates, legal 
institutions and courts in these contexts become the central arena for contestation over the 
status of religion, often enabling activists to advance a religious agenda through strategic 
engagement with religious courts. Shifting attention from constitutional courts to 
religious courts provides a different lens on how legal institutions may moderate or 
amplify specific religious agendas. In particular, where there is jurisdictional bifurcation 
between religious and civil courts—that is, where there is no appellate mechanism for 
civil review of decisions taken by religious courts—Moustafa highlights that 
constitutional courts will seldom play the moderating role envisioned by Hirschl. 
Critical to Moustafa’s account of how legal institutions may serve to intensify 
controversies over religion and augment polarization is the question of bifurcated 
jurisdiction. In the Malaysian case, the absence of an appellate mechanism for civil courts 
to review decisions by Malaysia’s “syariah courts” generates critical legal lacunae for 
individuals seeking recognition for conversion, divorce or child custody in circumstances 
that involve cross-communal identities. As Moustafa notes, “a bifurcated legal system 
hardwires complex institutional dilemmas,” especially in a multi-religious society in 
which Muslims and non-Muslims are likely to become legally entangled. The rigid legal 
categories imposed by the state in defining the religious identity of its citizens are in 
tension with the fluidity of such identities in practice. As Moustafa shows, one result is 
that for those categorized as Muslim, there is no legal mechanism available for 
conversion. Deemed by civil courts to be a matter for syariah courts, conversion is 
foreclosed because syariah courts decline to adjudicate these cases. For those in mixed 
marriages the challenges multiply further. With no means of having mixed marriages 
recognized by the state, Moustafa outlines countless cases where couples have opted for 
paper conversion or unregistered marriages and then find themselves grappling with 
complex legal and custody issues that often end up assigned to syariah courts over the 
objection of the non-Muslim spouse or parent.  
In these cases, the rigidity of the law and the absence of appellate review by civil courts 
generates gaps in the legal order for individuals whose identities and relationships place 
them at the blurred boundary between Muslim and non-Muslim. In this sense, the law 
literally constitutes the dispute (with categories that render claims non-cognizable and 
erase claimants’ identities) and produces jurisdictional limitations that deny recourse to 
rights protections. Weaving his argument through cases involving birth, child custody, 
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marriage, divorce, conversion, and burial, Moustafa illustrates in vivid and often 
disturbing detail the personal stakes for litigants, the complex strategies deployed by 
lawyers, and the ways in which third party actors and social movements use dramatic 
cases to produce narrow and polarizing framings of the issues. Moustafa argues that the 
narratives mobilized by political entrepreneurs around controversial cases—and their use 
of mass media to target specific ethnolinguistic communities with their preferred framing 
of the issues—is a channel by which court opinions have radiating (and polarizing) 
effects on popular legal and religious consciousness. 
Moustafa’s central theoretical claim is that law and courts constitute (and fuel) struggles 
over religion. In the Malaysian case, he shows that courts have in the process often 
served to advance religious agendas rather than play a secularizing role. Where religious 
courts are the exclusive arbiter of disputes at the boundary of their jurisdiction, it is 
perhaps not entirely surprising that they give greater weight to religious rites than liberal 
rights. Moustafa’s insights on this point are generalizable to all other contexts in which 
jurisdiction is bifurcated in a manner comparable to the Malaysian case, either de jure or 
as a de facto matter with civil courts reluctant to review syariah court decisions.  
Moustafa draws on a broad interdisciplinary literature to develop several other important 
arguments. He argues that British colonial rule effectively entrenched an illiberal vision 
of Islam—producing a distinctive Anglo-Muslim law. Moustafa cites the work of 
anthropologists, historians, and Islamic law scholars—from Hussein Agrama to Shahab 
Ahmed to Khaled Abou El Fadl—to demonstrate that colonial codification of Islamic law 
advanced a selective reading of an otherwise heterogeneous and pluralist legal tradition. 
Moreover, identity categories that were once porous and permeable were demarcated by 
sharp boundary lines through the fixity of codification in the colonial period, contributing 
to the contemporary controversies that he examines. Though there may not be intrinsic 
tension between Islamic law and liberal rights, the colonial legacy version of shariah is, 
on his account, at odds with liberal rights. His fascinating discussion tracing the tight 
regulation of religion in Malaysia to the colonial context helps explain precisely how and 
why the negotiation of religious identity boundaries has been channeled to the courts in 
Malaysia.  
The distinctiveness of courts as a forum for negotiating religious conflict comes into 
focus against this backdrop. As Moustafa notes, the institutional arrangements provided 
by the Malaysian state provide no arbiter when individuals subject to different legal 
regimes are embroiled in a single legal dispute. The adversarial context through which 
courts operate then amplifies contestation by framing parties as advancing opposing 
claims that are religious versus individual rights-protective. The critical role of 
institutional design in exacerbating religious conflict and producing the rights-versus-
rites binary is further magnified by Malaysia’s structure of bifurcated jurisdiction. Formal 
rules of jurisdiction become the focal point for disputes over religious identity, and 
activists—including litigants and third parties—develop advocacy and media strategies to 
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dramatize the stakes of adversarial cases shaped by those rules. Moustafa’s argument 
concerning the ways institutional complexity incentivizes actors to frame disputes in 
polarizing ways has several interesting implications. First, it suggests that the 
judicialization of religion may not have the secularizing effect theorized by Hirschl and 
others even in cases where jurisdiction is not bifurcated. Making courts the focal point of 
disputes over religion-state relations produces strategic opportunities for political 
entrepreneurs to capture the public imagination through stark us-versus-them 
presentations framed in adversarial terms. The use of courts to construct the binary of 
secular and religious, or rights-versus-rites, is not unique to Malaysia or even the 
Muslim-majority world. Indeed, Moustafa discusses examples of ideological mobilization 
over religious issues through litigation in the United States, particularly in debates about 
abortion and same-sex marriage. 
A second interesting implication is the jurisgenerative potential of the strategic litigation 
that Moustafa describes. As he notes, “efforts to legislate Islam open new fields of 
contestation that draw new participants into the production of religious knowledge.” On 
the one hand, the codification of Anglo-Muslim law reduced the pluralism of Islamic law 
in ways that are illiberal and authoritarian on Moustafa’s account. On the other hand, the 
cases he examines in Malaysia demonstrate the ways in which litigants and advocacy 
groups are exercising agency in seeking to influence and shape the forum, meaning, and 
interpretation of sharia in the Malaysian context. Islamic law in Malaysia is far from 
static, despite the fixity of legal categories. Rather, the volume offers a dynamic account 
of actors navigating institutional complexity to reshape the legal order by advancing their 
religious agenda.  
Moustafa concludes the volume with a brief chapter that offers some comparative 
reflections on the contrast between the Malaysian and Egyptian cases. He notes that 
judicialization of religion need not provoke the same degree of polarization 
everywhere—in Egypt, he finds that giving constitutional status to Islam as the religion 
of the state has resulted in a constitutional jurisprudence that has “bolstered liberal rights 
more often than an Islamist agenda” without generating much media coverage or social 
mobilization. The absence of jurisdictional conflict between civil and religious courts and 
Egyptian judges who avoided framing questions in terms of a secular/religious binary 
explains this difference on Moustafa’s account. One question raised by this comparison is 
whether Moustafa’s theory concerning the judicialization of religion is equally applicable 
in contexts where debates about the secular/religious divide occur largely within a single 
religious community. In his brief discussion of the Egypt comparison Moustafa argues 
that the case demonstrates the degree to which sociopolitical context and legal institutions 
matter to the impact of judicializing religion. This raises but does not fully address the 
question of whether the Malaysian case—where contestation takes place across sectarian 
lines and in the context of bifurcated jurisdiction—is distinctive in ways that limit the 
applicability of his insights about how courts may exacerbate divisions. Many of the 
principal debates about the secular/religious divide in the broader Muslim world find 
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members of the same religious community on opposing sides when considering dual 
commitments to liberal and religious rights (the same is also true in non-Muslim 
countries like Israel where religion is judicialized). How do the implications of 
Moustafa’s argument differ in these contexts? 
Moustafa explicitly notes that while he shares Ayelet Shachar’s view that there is no 
inevitable conflict between religious accommodation and liberal rights, he believes 
optimism on that score should be tempered by careful attention to institutional design and 
path dependent religious doctrine. In short, the combination of a commitment to an 
illiberal version of sharia (derived from Anglo-Muslim law) and institutional complexity 
in Malaysia do not bode well for a favorable balance between rights and rites. The 
comparison with Egypt suggests that institutional complexity and the cross-sectarian 
character of the divisions over liberal and religious rights may have been more significant 
in Malaysia than anything intrinsic to the particular version of religious doctrine. 
Moreover, the evident significance of activists’ roles in using legal institutions to shape 
popular religious and legal consciousness in Malaysia speaks to the possibility of revising 
understandings of the role of religion in the legal order. Perhaps this suggests room for 
greater optimism, leaving open the possibility that similar revisions might be deployed in 
future to privilege less repressive interpretations. 
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Patricia Sloane-White, “Deepening the Zero-Sum Binary” 
 
Tamir Moustafa’s book Constituting Religion: Islam, Liberal Rights, and the Malaysian 
State provides a historical and theoretical explanation for how a series of never-ending 
and endlessly written-about jurisdictional battles in Malaysia concerning religious 
conversion, custody, and “body snatching” came to be. (Decades old, some of these cases 
remain contemporary as the courts—and scholars—continue to revisit them.) Moustafa 
provides a comprehensive and, to my mind, definitive explanation for what he calls the 
“fault line down the middle of the Malaysia judiciary”—a crisis in jurisdiction brought 
about by “the judicialization of religion,” that is, when courts increasingly adjudicate 
questions and controversies over religion in a setting ripe for legal complexity. He 
speculates—and this is a key contribution of his book—why and where such fissures 
might happen. That they happen in Malaysia has “little to do with religion itself” and 
“everything to do with the regulation of religion (as a state project).” Tracing that project 
from the colonial era to Malaysian Independence and to a bifurcated legal regime and 
constitution that, in distinguishing Muslims from non-Muslims, “sowed the seeds for 
protracted legal battles later,” Moustafa describes the bitter fruit those seeds ultimately 
bore with the passage of Article 121(1A) in 1988.  
This constitutional amendment, meant to clarify matters of jurisdiction between civil and 
syariah courts, had the opposite effect. It not only increased legal ambiguities, but also 
stirred up social and public discord as it produced a series of highly publicized, 
controversial, and emotionally fraught court cases dealing with personal status law for 
Muslims and those non-Muslims ensnared by it. At the same time, increasingly illiberal 
adjudications involving Muslim personal status law in Malaysia has widened the 
dichotomy between sharia and civil law, leaving the debates over these domains, and the 
dilemmas—often heartbreaking—of petitioners unresolved. These controversies and legal 
debates have made Malaysians more keenly aware of sharia’s legal machinery and status, 
and have generated heated debates over sharia’s reach and role, polarizing Islamist-
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leaning activists and their more or less more secular counterparts into what Moustafa 
calls a “zero-sum binary between rights and rites.” His book ends on a troubling note: 
“once this process starts, it tends to feed upon itself.”  
Moustafa briefly mentions another space where judicialization of religion in Malaysia is 
taking place. He notes: “Recently, the civil courts have ceded jurisdiction in areas outside 
the domain of personal status law. A good example of this concerns the authority of the 
Sharia Advisory Council of the Central Bank of Malaysia vis-à-vis the civil courts.” This 
is where my own work on Malaysia’s Islamic economy and its religious/legal 
“gatekeepers” begins—and where, I argue, Islam’s “rites” increasingly—but with much 
less public drama and scrutiny than high-profile Article 121(1A) cases—become legally 
institutionalized Islamic rights. Some background is necessary on this point. 
As Moustafa notes, sharia jurisdiction in much of the Muslim world concerns personal 
status law, that is, munakahat. Munakahat is merely one domain of sharia; there are four 
in total. Commercial law in Islam concerns the sharia domain known as muamalat. (The 
others are ibadat [the rituals and practices of worship and belief] and jinayat [rules that 
state penalties for crimes and offences]). Malaysian commerce officially entered the 
realm of muamalat when it ratified its first Islamic Banking Act in 1983. This paved the 
way for the development of Malaysian Islamic finance. It meant that certain banks and 
financial institutions were licensed to transact in sharia-compliant business and products, 
while somewhat perplexingly, Islamic commercial law remained in the jurisdiction of 
civil, not syariah, courts. However dissatisfying this was to the growing community of 
Islamic bankers, the reasons for maintaining civil jurisdiction over muamalat were 
manifold: syariah courts dealt with Muslim persons and the personal status of non-
Muslim others connected to them, as the Article 121(1A) cases demonstrate, while 
Islamic banks theoretically could and in practice do transact business with non-Muslims. 
Many Islamic financial operations, although their financial practices were premised in 
sharia, thus still fell under civil laws pertaining to contracts, incorporation, and 
bankruptcy. Finally, syariah courts lacked the necessary procedural rules to engage with 
the complex nature of business cases. Therefore, when inevitable conflicts emerged 
between Islamic financial institutions and litigants, civil courts heard the cases, uniformly 
applied civil and common laws in settling them, and rendered secular, not Islamically-
based, decisions.  
But in 2009, after a series of problematic court cases involving customers of Islamic 
banks in which civil judges reversed or ignored fiqh al-muamalat principles that 
theoretically governed Islamic contracts in Malaysia, Parliament passed the Central Bank 
of Malaysia Act 701. The new law stated that the legal opinions or fatwas issued by the 
elite members of the Sharia Advisory Council (SAC) of the Central Bank were the final 
and sole authority concerning “the Islamic law on any financial matter” (Laws of 
Malaysia, Central Bank of Malaysia 2009, Act 701). Any court or arbitrator was then 
bound to apply sharia rulings made by the SAC or required to refer any question 
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concerning Islamic business to it for a fatwa. Like the earlier move in 1988 when the 
Constitution of Malaysia was amended by Article 121(1A) to establish that civil courts 
had no jurisdiction over syariah courts, this act granted members of the SAC (all of them 
Islamic scholars)—and their sharia opinions—unprecedented legal status in Malaysia 
(even though the Sharia Advisory Council is not a judicial body).  
Moreover, a further adjustment to federal law stated that members of the SAC would 
henceforth be appointed by the Yang Di Pertuan Agong (king), after consulting with the 
Conference of Rulers and the Prime Minister. This procedure not only meant that sharia 
advisors on the SAC were appointed via the same federal-level mechanism applied to 
civil court judges, it also distinguished them from sharia judges, who hear cases related to 
Islamic personal-status law and infractions of certain Islamic criminal laws in Malaysia’s 
individual states and, who are, by contrast, appointed by the sultans of their individual 
states. This meant many firsts for Malaysia’s judicial system—and by implication, a 
much greater binary between “rights and rites” than Malaysia has yet seen.  
For the first time in Malaysia’s history, sharia interpretations made by sharia advisors 
regarding muamalat could have an impact in the realm of civil law. For the first time in 
Malaysia’s history, their sharia interpretations could be applied to non-Muslim persons 
who were litigants in cases concerning muamalat, thereby binding people, regardless of 
their religion (such as the Malaysian Chinese, who are the primary retail customers of 
Islamic finance), to Islamic law. For the first time in Malaysia’s history, sharia advisors’ 
precepts concerning sharia could be applied to legal entities—that is, corporate, public, 
and private institutions—which were not persons and therefore constitutionally did not 
have a religion. For the first time in Malaysia’s history, a constitutional premise was in 
doubt, as the Federal Constitution states that no other body can make a decision in a legal 
dispute except a court and that any law authorizing or conferring such power to any body 
other than a court of law to decide a legal dispute is unconstitutional. 
But unlike Article 121(1A) which established that civil courts had no jurisdiction over 
syariah courts and generated decades of controversy about the personal statuses of 
Muslim and non-Muslim litigants in Malaysia, no Islamist or secular activists spoke out 
about this Act; no public alarms were raised. Not only were these parliamentary 
adjustments with significant constitutional implications made without public debate or 
knowledge, now sharia had enforceability in civil law sectors. The changes seemed 
largely to escape the notice of critics and NGOs concerned with the Malaysian 
government’s efforts to widen the scope of sharia over civil and federal law and the 
secular rights defended by the 1957 Malaysian Constitution. Finally, at the very moment 
I write this, sharia’s position concerning muamalat over civil law has been confirmed. On 
April 10, 2019, the nine-member Federal Court Bench handed down a landmark majority 
judgement stating that any decision by the SAC (again, comprised of a set of sharia 
experts but not a judicial body) is “constitutional and binding on civil courts” and 
supersedes them on sharia matters. Citing Sections 56 and 57 of the Central Bank of 
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Malaysia Act 701, which granted total finality to the SAC’s decisions, the Federal Court 
determined that these sections were constitutional. Via Islamic finance, “rites” have 
increased their power over “rights” in Malaysia. 
What are the possible outcomes of moves of this kind? Few critics of the Islamization of 
the Malaysian state have noticed these incremental but possibly monumental legal 
adjustments. It seems generally true that the advancement of sharia in Malaysia’s Islamic 
economy, where financial products focus on global commerce, market expansion, and 
profit, rarely implies the conservative, repressive, illiberal, and intrusive premises that 
sharia over persons does to critics in Malaysia and elsewhere who worry about its 
imposition. To many observers, Islamic economics is clearly the most acceptable of 
religious judicializations, allowing Muslims to operate adroitly within (and profit from) 
capitalism. Moustafa warns that when the “rights-versus-rites-binary” is seen as a zero-
sum game, “it tends to feed upon itself.” To his statement I add the words of one of my 
interlocutors, who serves now in the role of “judge” on the Central Bank’s empowered 
and elite SAC, who told me that the ease with which Malaysians have accepted 
advancing the sharia of muamalat over civil law will pave the way for further and 
broader Islamic regulation; to him, it was the thin end of the wedge to advance the cause 
of sharia in all aspects of Malaysian life. To echo what Moustafa says about the legal 
consequence of such “zero-sum” polemics, “once the process starts” who knows where it 
will end. 
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Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, “Mansplaining Religion” 
 
One of the lies modernity pedals is that you can and should choose your own religion, 
your own religious tradition, and your own version of that tradition. Virtually every 
country in the world now formally subscribes to the necessity of legally-protected 
freedom of choice in matters of religion. And much has been written to show how the law 
that encoded and encodes these guarantees, what Tamir Moustafa, in his terrific new 
book, terms the “constituting” of religion, was and is founded on poorly considered and 
ideologically-indebted assumptions about what counts as religion, assumptions that are 
dependent on a peculiar conjunction of notions of the modern self with identity politics. 
(See, e.g., Benjamin Berger, Law’s Religion (2015); Cécile Laborde, Liberalism’s 
Religion (2017); Jolyon Thomas, Faking Liberties (2019); and Winnifred Fallers 
Sullivan, et al., eds., Politics of Religious Freedom (2015).) Many of us have argued that 
the widening gap between law’s religion and the religion of actual people has become 
fatal to the project of legally protecting religious freedom. But I am not sure that our 
effort at exposing these lies has been entirely successful. Among other things, as I will 
discuss below, after engaging Moustafa’s work, in making these arguments we have often 
found ourselves in the troubling position of explaining to litigants and to their supporters 
that they do not understand their own religion and that they are victims of the false 
consciousness produced by the modern state. Doing this exposes us to the just criticism 
that we ourselves are advocating for a kind of religious orthodoxy. 
*   *   * 
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In his wonderful and wonderfully concise new book, Constituting Religion: Islam, 
Liberal Rights, and the Malaysian State, Tamir Moustafa makes an important 
contribution to this literature. Setting his study in the context of socio-legal scholarship 
more broadly, Moustafa shows how the judicialization of religion has worked in 
Malaysia in particular. But the lesson of his book is a much broader one. This is a book 
that should be read by all who are interested in how religious freedom works, legally 
speaking, particularly, perhaps, by Americanists.  
Moustafa describes several recent Malaysian cases and the play that they have received in 
the press, the “court of public opinion,” as he terms it, in order to illustrate the paradoxes 
and contradictions produced by the extensive laws regulating religion in Malaysia and the 
litigation generated by them. Employing ethnographic, survey, and archival methods, 
Moustafa shows how modern law has had the unintended effect, not of defusing, but of 
ratchetting up, religious tensions. As he further shows, while Malaysian law today is 
widely regarded as one of most complete instantiations of an effort to codify and enforce 
Islamic norms through state law, both the British colonial and post-independence legal 
regimes have been and are largely run by people who know little of Islam. 
Malaysia is a religiously and ethnically diverse country; slightly more than 50 percent are 
Malay (mostly Muslim), 25 percent are ethnically Chinese (of whom 75 percent are 
Buddhist, and the rest principally Taoist or Christian), and 8 percent Indian (mostly 
Hindu). Religion and personal law matters are governed in Malaysia today through a two-
tier court system, a system of Syariah courts at the state level for Muslim Malaysians, and 
civil courts at the state and federal levels for non-Muslims. Both sets of courts enforce a 
state-produced code, one significantly indebted to British colonial era law. All judges are 
trained in common law style. Over the last decade, jurisdictional disputes between the 
two court systems have increasingly led to a deferral of issues concerning religious status 
to the Syariah courts, even in the case of mixed marriage, conversion, child custody, and 
inheritance, where one of the parties is not Muslim. Appeals to constitutional norms of 
religious freedom are more and more falling on deaf ears in the face of claims by some 
Muslims who express concern about an existential threat to the Muslim community from 
what is characterized as liberal secularism. In the media-saturated and stoked 
environment of what he calls the rights versus rites controversies surrounding these cases, 
Moustafa carefully traces the ways in which an earlier legal and religious pluralism of 
interpretation has given way to an often simple-minded and dogmatic orthodoxy. 
While the hot cases differ in their details from those in the United States, the structure of 
the story is familiar. A clash between communalist and individualist versions of religious 
freedom creates an impossible bind. A polarized public discourse exacerbates tensions. 
Speaking of the illusions of religious freedom in the United States, Courtney Bender has 
shown how faith in pluralism combined with legally guaranteed freedom in matters of 
religion has over time come to be understood according to a market model. While earlier 
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mid-twentieth century sociological versions of pluralism were understood to generate a 
kind of benign convergence in a tolerant religion of Americanism, today pluralism is 
understood by researchers and by the public to generate a free market in religion, one 
that, as with other consumer products, produces better versions of each religion. Yet, as 
Bender explains, if sociologists of religion were to take the market metaphor seriously 
they would also have to take seriously the ways in which markets make their consumers: 
“Various regulations and norms operate within and at the boundaries of fields, and have 
the effect of shaping (or demanding) some measure of conformity by all actors who 
participate within them.”  
We see in Moustafa’s account a similar shaping process, disciplining the participants into 
the state’s discourse about religion. But these new streamlined illiberal versions of 
religion are not solving the Malaysian state’s governance problems. They are only 
producing more judicialized religion. 
As in many other places, legal regulation, litigation, and media together have produced in 
Malaysia a discourse which pits secular liberalism against a particular anti-modernist 
version of religion in a zero-sum game, one understood to be natural. As Moustafa says, 
“Islam and liberal rights are increasingly co-constitutive.” Yet the Islam of this familiar 
now global discourse is unrecognizable to scholars of Islam, particularly to those who 
celebrate its complex and varied history. Earlier pluralist accounts of Islamic law and of 
its varied accommodations across space and time of the diverse populations of Malaysia 
are no longer recognizable to many Malaysians. 
While there are aspects of the Malaysian case that are particular to its history and its mix 
of population, the dynamic Moustafa describes, as he himself notes, can be found 
elsewhere, including in the United States. While marriage, custody, and inheritance laws 
in the United States are not explicitly tied, as they are in Malaysia, to identification with 
religious communities encoded on state ID cards, litigation on other issues, particularly 
with respect to abortion, accommodation of religious conscience, and schools, produces a 
familiar pattern of simplified opposition between secular liberals and religious 
conservatives, with various media fanning the flames.  
A by-product of the whole modern religious freedom regime, as Moustafa notes, is the 
production of expertise on religion. On the one hand, governments since colonial times 
have designed laws and produced regulations and handbooks designed to foster legal 
religion, laws and processes based in selective and narrowing appropriations of the 
tradition. On the other, academics and liberal pundits scurry around explaining that good 
religion is not like that. Good religion, they say, is rich, capacious, and forgiving.  
Another by-product of the modern legal regulation of religion is that the state’s efforts are 
remarkably effective at converting subjectivities. People’s own understandings of their 
religion have in fact been changed by the new legal and media environment. While 
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scholars show how the religious authority constituted by the Syariah courts is invented by 
the state, and is not essential to Islam, which boasts a much more nuanced and 
sophisticated legal history, Moustafa cites surveys that show that most Malaysians now 
believe that Islam is properly understood as dogmatic and inflexible. This Islam is a 
product of the modern state, characteristic of what Shahab Ahmed called the legal-
supremacist model of Islam, and yet it has taken on the aura of a timely essence. (An 
analogous shift in south east Asian religio-legal consciousness is well documented by 
David and Jaruwan Engel in the case of Northern Thai Buddhism in their Tort, Custom 
and Karma.) 
The culture wars within religions then, as Moustafa shows so well, are not native to those 
traditions but are in fact generated by the very law that is supposed to prevent them, in 
Malaysia and elsewhere. Liberal academics—and liberal Muslims—cry foul, just as do 
liberal Christians in the United States—when presented with a version of religion that 
they argue is inconsistent with its history. Christians, many American academics say, 
have not always been defined by sexual morality. Reducing Christianity to these 
positions misrepresents what Christianity is, they say. Religious freedom laws, they 
imply, should protect good liberal religion, not these distortions of its teachings.  
*   *   * 
I would argue that now is a good moment to step back from the valiant efforts of legal 
and religious historians, sociologists and anthropologists to describe the effects of 
modern law on religion; we are now in a position to ask whether we are not also, like the 
modern state we so relentlessly criticize, victims of unintended consequences. We might 
see ourselves, not as well-meaning reformers, but as liberal mansplainers telling people 
that they don’t understand their own religion. Indeed, an entire segment of the media, 
low-brow and high-brow, is devoted to this work, from the spirituality sections of airport 
bookstores and public radio to immensely learned books like Shabab Ahmed’s What is 
Islam?, cited by Moustafa. A large part of projects on fostering religious literacy and 
improving journalism about religion is also devoted to this work. But we also do it in our 
classrooms. 
Rereading Moustafa’s Constituting Religion in the same week in which I was re-reading 
Ahmed’s What is Islam?, both fascinating and important works, has dramatized for me 
the challenges faced by those of us who would teach religion today—under the flag of 
religious freedom—because I think most of religious studies does understand itself to fly 
under such a banner. I want particularly to note the effort of many in the academy today, 
notwithstanding the thorough critique of the category, to stabilize religion in service of 
liberal norms. (Those who would teach outside those norms are also captive in many 
ways to the same legal logic, given the dominance of law’s religion today.) There is a 
sense in which many of us in religious studies today conceive our job to be to teach 
people that Shahab Ahmed rather than the Malaysian court has got it right when it comes 
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to Islam—with parallel oppositions relevant in other national and religious contexts. Is it 
our job to do that? Why should people listen to us? Have we carefully considered what 
exactly is at stake in this effort? Do we understand why—and if—religious choices are 
being made, whether by Malaysians or by Americans? 
One of the many frustrating paradoxes of religious freedom as a liberal project is that 
having promised people religious choice, liberals cannot now, in good conscience, dictate 
to them what they should choose. (See my post on the Hobby Lobby decision.) Unless we 
are willing to start listening and speaking theologically, that is, unless we are willing to 
listen carefully and speak directly of the existential realities that we all face, rather than 
using religion as a proxy for our differences, I fear that our efforts at explanation will fall 
on deaf ears.  
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Kristen Stilt, “Conversion and Demographic Anxieties” 
 
With vivid and compelling writing, Tamir Moustafa in Constituting Religion takes us into 
the Malaysian state’s creation and management of law that is purportedly Islamic. 
Following in the line of Talal Asad, Hussein Agrama, and others, Moustafa reminds us 
that calling this law “Islamic law” is problematic on many levels. Such a naming also 
plays into the hand of the Malaysian state, which wants Malaysian citizens, and indeed 
Muslims worldwide, to believe that this state-created law is indeed “Islamic law” with all 
of the claims to authority that come with such a label. And as Moustafa shows, Malaysia 
has adopted a vast range of these so-called Islamic laws, covering just about every aspect 
of life. For readers interested in Islamic law and society, and especially for those who 
might not have thought that Malaysia is in the company of Iran and Saudi Arabia in terms 
of the state’s efforts to define and control Islam, Constituting Religion is essential 
reading. 
The central character of Constituting Religion is a provision of the Malaysian 
Constitution, Article 121 (1A). Adopted as an amendment in 1988, it specifies that the 
High Courts “shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of 
the Syariah courts.” The amendment meant that “Muslims would henceforth be subject to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Syariah courts in matters of religion.” 
Moustafa is the first to my knowledge to attempt to provide a history of the amendment, 
linking it to the lawyer Ahmad Mohamed Ibrahim. Ibrahim became an advocate for a 
greater place for Islamic law in the state after he represented a Muslim family in 
Singapore that was fighting for the return of their adopted daughter from her Dutch 
biological parents. Before 1988, civil courts rarely exercised jurisdiction in matters 
related to the syariah courts, and Moustafa provides some examples of those early cases. 
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But Ibrahim and others sought a constitutional change to “prevent the federal civil courts 
from overturning state-level shariah court decisions.” Citing Prime Minister Mahatir 
Mohamed’s expressed need to address the feeling of dissatisfaction among Muslims 
when a civil court cancels a decision made by a syariah court, Moustafa shows that there 
was no evidence at the time for such a concern for the feelings of Malaysian Muslims. 
Rather, it seems fair to say that its advocates were anticipating that conflicts between the 
civil and syariah courts would develop and thus the amendment was a preemptive move, 
not a corrective one. And as a preemptive move, it had tremendous consequences. 
Once in place, clause 1A served as the basis for significant decisions, and Moustafa 
carefully covers all or at least most of them in Chapter 4. Reading all of these cases 
together in Chapter 4 reveals an intriguing pattern: all of them involve conversion, either 
non-Muslims who convert to Islam and then they (or their relatives on behalf of deceased 
individuals) want to revert back to their prior religion or Muslims who want to convert 
out of Islam. These conversion cases are heartbreaking because the state refuses to 
recognize an individual’s ability to determine his or her own religion. What these cases 
indicate is that from the perspective of the Malaysian governing institutions, keeping 
these individuals on the Muslim tally is paramount. It is not even about actual behavior, 
since some of these individuals practice other religions (such as a man named Maniam 
who, while officially Muslim as a result of a conversion, continued to practice Hinduism 
but was not able to convert back to Hinduism and be recognized by the state as such). 
The question that arises from all of these cases is why conversion? Why are conversions 
at the heart of all or most of the clause 1A cases? And why are other types of volatile 
legal issues, such as the implementation of the hadd criminal penalties, not appearing in 
clause 1A cases? 
On one level, there has been a tension between states restricting conversion, or more 
specifically, conversion from Islam to another religion, and a general human rights 
principle of the freedom to change one’s religious belief, dating at least back to the 
formation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. But the Malaysian case 
has its own very specific reasons for treating conversion as a highly sensitive issue, and 
Moustafa provides some clues in the demographics he cites. “Malays, who constitute just 
over half of the country’s population of 31 million, are defined as Muslim by way of the 
Federal Constitution.” Chinese are about 25 percent of the population and Indian are 
about 8 percent of the population. “The overall breakdown of the population by religion 
is approximately 60 percent Muslim, 19 percent Buddhist, 9 percent Christian, 6 percent 
Hindu, and 4 percent other faiths.” 
At the time of the adoption of the Malaysian constitution in 1958, Malays were also at 
best only 50 percent of the population, and were concerned about holding onto their 
power in a multiracial and multireligious federation. The constitution included privileges 
and benefits for ethnic Malays. It also included an establishment clause in Article 3, 
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which reads in part, “Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be 
practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation.” Scholarly work has 
focused on the drafting history of this clause. As I have noted, “The ruling United Malays 
National Organization (UMNO) did not seek to include the establishment clause as an 
expression of the religion of the majority of the citizenry, but rather UMNO and Malays 
in general sought it so desperately because they were not the majority, at least not a 
comfortable majority, and feared what the democratic process might bring in the future.” 
Because constitutionally Malays are Muslim, a benefit for Muslims was basically also a 
benefit for Malays. 
In the contemporary period, as Moustafa notes, “Religious cleavages have arguably 
eclipsed race, class, and other bases of political solidarity. In a broader sense, Islam has 
been instrumentalized in the service of the Malay ‘race’.” The concern for those holding 
onto power has shifted from seeking the highest percentage of Malays possible in the 
country to seeking the highest percentage of Muslims, all in the service of maintaining 
and expanding political power. 
The seriousness with which the government takes the issue of conversion is reflected in 
the response to the famous Lina Joy decision, which saw the government adding 
“religion” to the national identity cards. Moustafa says that “additional regulations were 
introduced to shore up religious and racial compartmentalization.” If conversion is seen 
as a threat to the existence of the ruling party, then it is to be expected that additional 
measures were added to force Muslims to stay Muslims. And it is also to be expected that 
“most state enactments provide no viable avenue for official conversion out of Islam.” 
Seeing the clause 1A cases through the lens of conversion amplifies all of Moustafa’s 
findings, including in Chapter 5, where he traces these cases through the courts of public 
opinion. Given that conversion cases by definition create the kind of zero-sum result that 
Moustafa criticizes—either the state recognizes an individual by the religion he or she (or 
his or her relatives) claims to be or it does not—it is not surprising that “these cases 
became the focal points for contestation over a great number of issues, including the 
appropriate place for Islam in the legal and political order, the secular versus religious 
foundations of the state, the rights of Muslim and non-Malay communities, individual 
rights and duties rights in Islam, and perennial questions around religious authority—that 
is, who has the right to speak for Islam.” The issue of conversion and the legal 
jurisdiction created by clause 1A serve to mutually reinforce one another and in doing so 
heighten the stakes for the individuals involved in the case and the public’s reaction to 
the decision. 
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Matthew Nelson, “Constituting Religion: From South Asia to Malaysia” 
 
 
 
At the start of his outstanding new book, Constituting Religion: Islam, Liberal Rights, 
and the Malaysian State, Tamir Moustafa explains that initially his ambition extended 
beyond Malaysia to a comparison of Malaysia, Pakistan, and Egypt. As one with an 
interest in both Malaysia and Pakistan, I read his book with that ambition in mind. 
Specifically, I read Moustafa’s new book as an account of the ways in which a particular 
country’s constitutional tension between “individual” and “group-based” religious 
freedoms has been legally and politically operationalized. In my reading, Moustafa’s 
account is not limited to Malaysia; the experience of Malaysia is also tied to the 
constitutional experience of South Asia. 
From South Asia to Malaysia 
The Constitution of Malaysia (1957) defines both individual and group-based religious 
freedoms in Article 11, noting that “every person has the right to profess and practice his 
religion” (11-1) and, further, that “every religious group has the right . . . to manage its 
own affairs” (11-3). Like Malaysia, Pakistan lifted similar constitutional provisions from 
India (Pakistan 1956: 10 and 11; 1973: 20-A and 20-B; India 1950: 25 and 26). In fact, 
this constitutional migration from South Asia to Malaysia is not surprising given the role 
that Indian and Pakistani judges played in the five-member Reid Commission that drafted 
postcolonial Malaysia’s constitution. Within the Reid Commission, it was actually Abdul 
Hamid from Pakistan who insisted that, notwithstanding references to individual and 
group-based religious freedoms (Article 11), Malaysia’s constitution should also 
recognize Islam as “the religion of the Federation” (Article 3). 
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Even apart from this South Asian constitutional lineage, the influence of South Asia 
appears in the realm of Muslim law. Moustafa notes that, in Malaysia, British colonial 
rule shifted the locus of Muslim legal authority away from diverse interpretations of 
sharia offered by individual Muslim scholar-jurists (muftis) in favor of a codified law—
what Moustafa calls a less “polyvocal” law—known as “Anglo-Muslim” law. This 
Anglo-Muslim law, however, grew out of the so-called “Anglo-Mohammadan law” 
enforced in British India. In fact, Malaysia’s Anglo-Muslim law—forged in colonial 
South Asia—came to underpin what many Malaysians now associate with the “Islamic” 
law operating in their own country’s state-level syariah courts. 
Both the individual and group-based religious freedoms outlined in Malaysia’s 
constitution and the Anglo-Muslim law operating in Malaysia’s syariah courts are thus 
closely tied to patterns that first took shape in South Asia. 
Further, Moustafa notes that the group-based rules governing Muslims as per the 
Malaysian constitution are often contrasted with—even pitted against—that constitution’s 
individual freedoms, with conservative Muslim activists frequently describing the latter 
as an unwelcome “colonial imposition.” But, of course, the individual rights enshrined in 
Malaysia’s constitution did not originate in imperial Britain. Instead they traveled from 
anti-colonial Ireland, via India, then Pakistan, as provisions explicitly opposed to a 
British constitutional tradition in which enumerated and enforceable rights were thought 
to infringe on the absolute sovereignty of parliament. 
The views articulated by conservative Muslim activists in Malaysia are, thus, largely 
upside down. The Anglo-Muslim laws underpinning a defense of what Moustafa calls 
group-based Muslim “rites” in Malaysia’s state-level syariah courts are, in many ways, a 
“colonial imposition.” The constitutional protections underpinning what Moustafa 
describes as a defense of individual religious “rights” in Malaysia’s civil courts reflects a 
more explicitly “anti-colonial” commitment. 
Again, the group-based religious freedoms that traveled from South Asia to Malaysia 
arrived in South Asia from Ireland (1937: Article 44-2[5]), which borrowed them from 
the constitution of Poland (1921: Article 113). These provisions were introduced to 
protect the rights of religious minorities. But, since the mid-1970s in Pakistan and, then, 
the mid-1980s in Malaysia, these provisions have been taken up and reinterpreted to 
champion the rites of each country’s Muslim majority. In Malaysia, Moustafa points to a 
shift of emphasis withinthe terms of Article 11, pulling away from 11-1, focusing on 
individuals, in favor of 11-3, focusing on religious groups. From a comparative 
perspective, however, what we see is also a “Pakistani” reading of Article 11-3. Whereas 
in the past, this article was read as protecting religious minorities, it is now read as 
protecting a particular (Muslim) majority. 
Malaysia: Beyond South Asia 
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Reading Moustafa’s account of the tension between individual and group-based rights 
from a comparative perspective is illuminating. But, having said this, it would be a 
mistake to read Moustafa’s account of Malaysia as historically or politically derivative. 
In fact, Moustafa clearly outlines what sets Malaysia apart. 
Unlike in South Asia, Moustafa explains that the regional sultans who enjoyed a measure 
of colonial-era sovereignty vis-à-vis Muslim religious affairs retained their position in 
Malaysia’s postcolonial constitutional bargain. Specifically, regional sultans retained 
their authority vis-à-vis state-level syariah courts, with a crucial constitutional 
amendment in 1988 (Article 121-1A) stating that these courts would enjoy exclusive 
jurisdiction over any Muslim religious matter outlined in the constitution’s allocation of 
state-level powers (Ninth Schedule, List II, Paragraph 1). This approach—what might be 
described as Malaysia’s Muslim religious federalism—differs from the constitutional 
experience of religion-state relations in South Asia. 
Explicit state-level legislation was expected to outline the ways in which Muslim 
religious matters would be handled by Malaysia’s state-level syariah courts. But, since 
1999, the jurisdiction of these state-level courts has been seen as “implied” (by 
Malaysia’s Federal Court) even without any such covering legislation. In fact, much of 
the tension between individual and group-based rights in Moustafa’s account grows out 
of what might be described as federal and state-level jurisdictional gaps. This is often 
related to so-called “121-1A cases,” in which individuals are sent to state-level syariah 
courts because they are legally defined as “Muslims” (by birth or conversion) even 
though, for various reasons, they do not actually identify as Muslims—either because 
they wish to leave Islam or because, as children, their religious identity was “mixed” (for 
example, they were unilaterally converted to Islam without the consent of both parents or 
they were raised as non-Muslims by mixed-religion couples who married informally, 
registering neither their marriage nor the birth of their children). Some of these “legal 
Muslims” wish to have their individual religious “choice” protected by the civil courts (as 
per Article 11-1). But, insofar as they are officially defined as Muslims, they have 
generally been required to follow the legal procedures outlined for Muslims as a group in 
state-level syariah courts. 
Again, the jurisdiction of state-level syariah courts has been assumed even when explicit 
statutes outlining the procedures governing a particular Muslim issue do not (yet) exist. 
In fact, several 121-1A cases involve a Catch-22 in which, so long as a particular state-
level legislature fails to create a covering law for Muslim issue X (say, a politically 
sensitive issue like Muslim apostasy involving competing commitments to individual 
religious choice and the notion that each religious group should “manage its own affairs” 
including entry and exit procedures), the individual is caught in legal limbo. Specifically, 
the individual is unable to obtain relief from the syariah courts (because s/he cannot 
complete, and the court cannot enforce, procedures that remain undefined). And, owing 
to an appreciation for the “separation of powers,” neither the syariah courts nor the civil 
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courts have sought to “legislate from the bench” to fill up the legislative lacunæ. 
Malaysia’s civil courts have consistently failed to defend the individual rights of “legal 
Muslims” precisely insofar as they have seen such efforts as an encroachment on the 
constitutional domain of state-level sultans and, therein, Malaysia’s principle of 
federalism vis-à-vis Muslim religious affairs. There is, of course, no empirical analogue 
for this pattern of constitutional, institutional, and political “Muslim religious federalism” 
in South Asia. 
South Asia, Malaysia, and the World 
Throughout his book, Moustafa expertly traces the polarization of public discourse 
(pitting the advocates of individual religious rights against the advocates of religious 
group rites) to Malaysia’s Muslim religious federalism and, especially, its system of 
parallel and competing civil and syariah courts. To explain this polarizing “judicialization 
of religion” he focuses on four key elements in particular, namely (a) a simultaneous 
constitutional commitment to “religious rites” and “liberal rights,” (b) the state’s robust 
regulation of religion, (c) explicit recognition of legal pluralism (i.e., different laws for 
different religious groups), and (d) strong but accessible courts. 
These four elements, however, do not automatically produce high-intensity religious-
cum-political polarization. In his conclusion, for instance, Moustafa turns to Egypt, 
where despite the presence of all four elements, the pattern of rights versus rites 
polarization is less intense. It is less intense because, returning to the centrality of 
Malaysia’s two-part system of civil and syariah courts, Egyptian religious litigation 
unfolds within what Moustafa calls a “unified” civil judiciary led by superior court 
judges with a consistently “liberal” orientation. 
Still, my comparative perspective focusing on South Asia left me with an underlying 
question: what accounts for the emergence of high-intensity polarization (pitting the 
supporters of liberal individual rights against the supporters of ostensibly religious group 
rites)—similar to that in Malaysia—where (a) several of Moustafa’s four key elements 
are missing or (b) a bifurcation of civil and syariah court jurisdiction is absent? In 
Pakistan, for instance, the courts are famously weak and inaccessible, state regulation of 
religion is anæmic (extensive state involvement notwithstanding), and until quite 
recently, postcolonial recognition of Hindu personal laws was technically nonexistent. In 
India, the courts are somewhat stronger, formal state regulation is somewhat more far-
reaching, and the presence of differentiated personal laws is historically well entrenched. 
But, in both countries, as noted above, there is no federalization of the courts’ religious 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, both India and Pakistan are deeply familiar with the high-
intensity rights versus rites polarization that Moustafa describes in Malaysia. 
Perhaps, pulling away from explicit forms of legal pluralism, strong/weak courts, and the 
federalization of religious jurisdiction, the polarization Moustafa describes could be 
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traced to a different set of tensions—a more general set of tensions involving, simply, 
constitutional protections for parochial religious attachments and whatever a given state 
might describe, at a particular moment in time, as an overarching but countervailing 
public interest. In democratic and authoritarian contexts around the world this tension is 
actually quite familiar: religious practice X (e.g., Ahmadi provocation) versus public 
order; religious practice Y (Native American peyote) versus public health; religious 
practice Z (Sikh turbans) versus public safety; and so on. 
It may be that Egypt’s liberal judges have been better able to navigate this generic 
tension. It may be that, with or without “liberal” judges, some of the legal strategies used 
to resolve this tension—typically by restricting this or that religious practice to serve the 
so-called (often majoritarian) “public good”—are simply more effective when it comes to 
stifling high-intensity public polarization. Restrictions on religious practice offset by 
“proportional” public benefits, for instance, may be more effective than the imposition of 
allegedly “reasonable” administrative burdens on selected religious actors or, following 
the courts in South Asia, the application of a formal distinction between so-called 
“essential” religious practices (protected from state interference) and so-called “non-
essential” practices (subject to state intervention for the sake of social reform). In fact, 
returning once again to the transnational influence of South Asia, the latter strategy 
migrated from India to Pakistan, then Malaysia, with consistently polarizing effects. 
Moustafa’s book is filled with analytical provocations and empirical insights. And, in 
keeping with Moustafa’s original intention, it is also filled with cross-national 
comparative reach: India, Pakistan, Egypt, and beyond. Indeed, toward the end of 
Moustafa’s book I found myself asking: if the federalization of religious-cum-legal 
jurisdiction (e.g., state-level syariah courts) drives high-intensity political polarization, 
should we expect a similar pattern of polarization owing to analogous federal legal 
structures in Nigeria? And, if not, what are the factors that might prevent this: “liberal” 
judges, patterns of jurisprudence offsetting religious claims with persuasive notions of the 
“public good,” a certain “margin of appreciation” for local variation vis-à-vis ostensibly 
overarching rights, or something else? 
It remains to be seen which strategies aiming to conciliate “parochial” religious 
attachments with invocations of the “public” interest might actually avoid the patterns of 
polarization Moustafa describes. But, thanks to Moustafa’s book, it is clear that scholars 
and practitioners with an interest in the relationship between religious freedom and 
political conflict will be in a much better position to look. 
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Jaclyn L. Neo, “Constituting Religion, Contesting Constitutional Identity” 
 
 
 
It is a truth universally acknowledged that religion, in the possession of man, causes 
division, conflict, and even war. Well, not quite, says Tamir Moustafa. In his new book, 
Constituting Religion: Islam, Liberal Rights, and the Malaysian State, he points to the 
role of law and courts in enabling and catalyzing such conflict by creating the conditions 
and forum for contestations over religion. In the course of adjudication, courts constitute 
those very contestations. 
The book intersects with recent scholarship on how constitutional design choices lead to 
contestations over religion (e.g., Asli Bâli and Hanna Lerner (2017); Benjamin Schonthal 
(2016); Dian A. H. Shah (2017)). Moustafa’s focus is different, however, as it focuses on 
what happens after constitutionalization. “Judicialization of religion,” he argues, is a 
distinctive phenomenon that should be differentiated from the judicialization of politics, 
conventionally understood as the way in which courts and judges increasingly dominate 
the making of public policies. For Moustafa, judicialization of religion refers to the 
condition where courts increasingly adjudicate questions and controversies over religion, 
thereby entrenching the idea of an official religion, and/or rendering judgment on the 
appropriate place for religion in the legal political order. Moustafa’s definition is aligned 
with a broader idea of judicialization as the increased presence of judicial processes and 
court rulings in political and social life. 
The book’s focus on judicialization builds upon Moustafa’s earlier work on the subject 
and indeed deepens it. However, unlike his earlier works that examine how and why 
authoritarian regimes coopt courts to ensure regime-preservation, this current book 
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interrogates the process of how judicialization comes about and how judicialization could 
exacerbate political and social conflict. Judicialization is seen as an outcome of social 
contestation in which the state is implicated but not necessarily the main driver of such 
contestations. Certain segments of government appear to be captured by—or at least lean 
toward—one position over another, yet Moustafa’s extensive fieldwork research supports 
the idea that judicialization is not a one-dimensional phenomenon. Rather, it is 
constituted by a variety of actors and shaped by multiple interests. Accordingly, he 
suggests that it would be too simplistic to see the many constitutional law cases 
concerning the role of Islam in Malaysia, and the public discourse arising from these 
cases, as a straightforward collision between ascendant religious movements and liberal 
legal order. Instead, in a country with a strong tradition of judicial review and a fairly 
independent bar, like in Malaysia, judicialization should be seen as a multidimensional 
phenomenon arising from sociopolitical contestation of a multitude of actors, some in 
government, over the role of Islam in the Malaysian state.  
In examining a range of cases arising from the interpretation of the constitutional 
provision delineating the jurisdictions between the Syariah and the civil courts (Article 
121(1A)), as well as provision designating Islam as the religion of the Federation (Article 
3(1)), Moustafa’s book challenges oft-made assumptions about the actors involved in 
championing particular ideas about Islam/religion in any state. In the Malaysian case, 
there is often an assumption of a clear divide between Muslims (supposedly in favor of a 
more muscular role for Islam) and non-Muslims. Indeed, judicial decisions in Malaysia 
appear to also conform to this divide, as Muslim judges tend to interpret the constitution 
to give Islam a more robust position in the constitutional order, whereas non-Muslim 
judges appear to favor individual freedoms and a narrower position for Islam. However, a 
Muslim/non-Muslim divide would be far too simplistic. For instance, the Federal Court 
judgment in Indira Gandhi Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak was written 
by a Malay-Muslim judge for a bench composed mainly of Malay-Muslim judges. This 
case contains the strongest reassertions of the civil courts’ judicial power and affirmed 
their higher status as a courts of inherent jurisdiction as opposed to the religious courts 
that are mere creatures of statute. This was a highly anticipated case about whether the 
constitution requires the consent of both parents (and not just one parent) for conversion 
of minors. The Federal Court asserted, for the first time since 1999, that it retains 
jurisdiction to determine legal questions concerning Islam. 
However, a limitation of a book like Moustafa’s that employs the lens of religion to 
examine a complex jurisdiction like Malaysia is a propensity to under-value other sources 
of identity that contribute to the contestation over religion. Here, I discuss two —race and 
language. First, the divisions arising from religion—Muslim/secular; Muslim/non-
Muslim; state/non-state, etc.—are furthermore complicated when we introduce the 
element of race-based (or ethnic-based) nationalism. While Moustafa acknowledges that, 
overall, the intertwining of race and religion is a crucial phenomenon in Malaysia, the 
role of race is given rather short shrift in the book. He explains that this is because the 
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ascendant political cleavage is articulated in terms of religion more than race. That might 
be so in some instances, but race is never far behind in public discourse over Islam. In 
Malaysia, Muslims continue to be referred to as “Malay-Muslim.” The Malaysian Federal 
Constitution defines a Malay as, inter alia, one who professes Islam. Indeed, one of the 
most telling phrases articulated in the infamous Lina Joy v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah 
apostasy case discussed in Moustafa’s book is this: “As a Malay, the plaintiff remains in 
the Islamic faith until her dying days.” There are many more instances of race being the 
dominant frame of contestation in Malaysia, including the recent brouhaha over the new 
Malaysian government’s failed attempt to ratify the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) which further demonstrates 
that race continues to be a strong social cleavage in Malaysia. The 2018 shock election of 
Pakatan Harapan, a new multiethnic coalition that broke the stranglehold of the previous 
Barisan Nasional alliance dominated by the Malay nationalist party (UMNO) may propel 
race further into the center of the debate.  
Secondly, language. The choice of language in communication reflects not only the 
perspective of the speaker but also the speaker’s targeted audience. In Malaysia, different 
language is used in different cases and mediums when discussing religion. Moustafa 
alludes to this when he mentions that his fieldwork focused not just on press coverage in 
major English language newspapers but also in newspapers in other languages, especially 
in the Malay language. However, more could have been done with this. He could have 
also engaged with the choice of language in judicial decisions. Fascinatingly, several 
crucial decisions concerning the role of Islam in Malaysia have been written in Malay, 
the most significant being the majority judgments in the Federal Court case of Lina Joy. 
There, the majority judgments denying the appeal to have Lina Joy’s conversion 
recognized were written in the Malay language, while the dissenting judgment in support 
of the appeal was written in the English language.  
Even more fascinating is the case of Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak & Ors v Fatimah bte 
Sihi & Ors, a seemingly obscure High Court case, which essentially overruled established 
precedent giving Islam a limited role within the constitutional order. This is one of the 
earliest and most radical attempts to establish a broad role for Islam in the Malaysian 
constitutional landscape, but interestingly has not been given as much attention in 
academic writings. This is even though the High Court’s interpretation of Article 3(1) 
was crucial in shifting the jurisprudence on what it means to declare Islam to be the 
religion of the Federation. In Meor, the High Court declared that Islam is superior over 
all other religions in Malaysia and further that Article 3(1) imposes obligations on the 
government to promote Islam so as to maintain its superior place in Malaysian society. 
The lack of attention given to the case could be because of its status as a High Court case 
whose ruling was ultimately overruled by the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court of 
Malaysia. However, another possibility is that it was written only in the Malay language. 
Only the headnotes were written in English, and they do not reflect the radical 
jurisprudential shift in the judgement. Interestingly, the High Court’s reasoning has 
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become the basis for an expansive view of Islam in public law in subsequent cases, 
including Lina Joy.  
Language has also become an important area of contestation in Malaysia, exemplified by 
the case of Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur v Menteri Dalam 
Negeri, where the court upheld a government prohibition on the Catholic Church in using 
the word “Allah” in their Malay language publications. The judgment endorses the view 
that the government can restrict the use of certain Malay words to only Muslims. This is a 
highly problematic position since Malay is the constitutionally-designated “national” 
language. This decision is often analyzed from the perspective of religious freedom, but it 
also throws up difficult questions about equal citizenship and the right to use a national 
language. Since the Malay language is traditionally seen as the language of the Malay 
community, this intertwining of language with religion reflects an ideology that the 
Malaysian state is to be defined in terms of one race (Malay), one language (Malay), and 
one religion (Islam).  
Accordingly, a more holistic examination of the contestations in Malaysia concerning the 
place of Islam requires also an understanding that this is a competition between those 
who champion the idea of an ethnic nation based on one language, one race, one religion, 
and those who affirm a civic nation able to accommodate a plurality of languages, races, 
and religions. I have previously argued that it is important to also understand that the 
contestation over religion is shaped by opposing ideologies about the Malaysian “nation.” 
This goes beyond personal identity; indeed, there are Malay-Muslims who strongly 
support a limited interpretation of the place of Islam in the Malaysian constitutional state, 
just as there are non-Malay-Muslims who agree with an expansive space for Islam. The 
struggle is ultimately one for the constitutional identity of the Malaysian state.  
Moustafa’s book provides vital insights into understanding the contestation over Islam in 
Malaysia as being driven by multiple actors and their strategies. Any limitations on its 
case study are perhaps understandable considering that it seeks to engage in a broader 
conversation about judicialization of religion. The book thus should be seen as containing 
important, even if incomplete, pieces of the puzzle to understand the judicialization of 
religion, both in Malaysia and in general.  
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Shanmuga Kanesalingam, “Judges, Lawyers, Politics: Religion Still Divides 
Malaysia” 
 
 
The plight of Indira Gandhi, a Hindu mother of three children whose estranged husband 
had converted from Hinduism to Islam and tried to “convert” the couple’s three children, 
plays a central role in Tamir Moustafa’s Constituting Religion. Whilst a number of legal 
challenges had been filed by Indira, the most far-reaching constitutional issues arose in a 
case challenging the conversion of her children. On January 29, 2018, a five-member all-
Muslim panel of Malaysia’s apex court, the Federal Court, unanimously quashed the 
Certificates of Conversion to Islam issued by the Perak Islamic Religious Affairs 
Authority as evidence of the religious identity of the three children of Indira Gandhi. Two 
of the children were with Indira at the time of this decision, but the youngest, taken away 
when just eleven months old, was still with the father who had disappeared. At the time 
of writing, Indira has still not seen her youngest daughter. (A summary of the entire case, 
and the Federal Court decision, by Ida Lim of the Malay Mail, can be found here.) 
The certificates of conversion, if left unchallenged, were by Malaysian law conclusive 
evidence that the children were Muslim for all time and thus subject to the Anglo-Muslim 
law that applies to Muslims in Malaysia. Thus, the children, despite professing 
themselves to be Hindus, would not have been able to marry a Hindu. They would 
commit criminal offenses for acts that were only criminal for Muslims in Malaysia, for 
example, if they ate in public during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan. 
The High Court had earlier ruled in Indira’s favor, but two of the three judges in the 
Court of Appeal had reversed the High Court. They neatly sidestepped the core 
constitutional issues by stating that the civil courts had no jurisdiction to hear any matter 
that touched on Islamic law. This was the state of the case at the time Constituting 
Religion was written. 
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The lead judgment in the Federal Court was authored by Justice Zainun Ali, the sole 
woman judge on the panel. She held that not only did the civil courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear disputes of this nature, but that Malaysia’s Federal Constitution 
required both parents to consent before their minor children could be recognized by the 
state as having been converted to Islam. This had been a key concern of religious 
minorities in Malaysia, afraid of the increasingly politicized Muslim community using 
their control of most state institutions to convert their children by unethical means.  
I was one of Indira’s lawyers, all of us acting for her pro bono except for some very 
limited funding to cover out-of-pocket expenses and court filing fees. Human rights 
lawyers in Malaysia are generally, like me, attorneys who do mostly corporate, 
commercial, or other fee-paying work and act for victims of human rights abuses on a pro 
bono basis. I also work with the Malaysian Centre for Constitutionalism and Human 
Rights, of which I am a founding director, to advance human rights through a mix of 
strategic litigation, blogging, and training other lawyers. 
The decision by the Federal Court marked a sea change in the way the courts dealt with 
religion and religious freedom issues. To understand why, we must first backtrack a little. 
Impact of Indira Gandhi 
Practitioners in Malaysia rarely delve into academic texts, and hardly ever delve into 
research by non-lawyers on the impact of the law on society. Thus, “Anglo-Muslim law” 
is a term I first came across when reading Moustafa’s book, although it is clearly a term 
that has some history in academic literature. The term describes laws enacted by 
legislatures modeled on Britain’s Parliament, relics of colonial rule, but that are 
administered to regulate Muslims or the practice of Islam. Under Malaysia’s Federal 
Constitution, Islamic law and the personal law of persons professing the religion of Islam 
are matters to be legislated by the ordinary legislatures of the state (where both Muslim 
and non-Muslim members can participate in the law making).  
Moustafa conducted research for the first time (to my knowledge) on the views and 
perceptions of ordinary Muslims in Malaysia on the “Islamic” or “Syariah” law that is 
administered by the state and that regulates them. His research finds that what is in fact 
Anglo-Muslim law was viewed by a majority of Muslims in Malaysia as the embodiment 
of the Syariah itself. Vast numbers of the persons surveyed consider that state Islamic laws 
derive exclusively from the Syariah (see Chapter 6 of Constituting Religion). This is 
despite the clear inconsistencies between the Syariah in its traditional form and as 
understood by most scholars of the religion, and Anglo-Muslim law as applied in Malaysia.  
Until Indira Gandhi’s case appeared in the Federal Court, only a handful of lower court 
judges had recognized the reality that the Syariah courts were in fact merely applying 
Anglo-Muslim law through state-level legislation. Here, in the Federal Court, five 
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Muslim judges unanimously held that it was in fact the civil courts who had jurisdiction 
to interpret the legality and constitutionality of state-level “Islamic” laws and the actions 
of state-level “Islamic” authorities.  
In the drive to further the regulation of religion (as a state project), the “liberal” voices 
had apparently won a major victory. Or had they?  
Apostasy Is a Different Matter 
Just weeks after the Gandhi decision, however, two of the same judges were sitting in an 
appeal in the state of Sarawak, on the island of Borneo. This time, the appeal involved 
four adults classified as Muslim by the state who sought constitutional relief to recognize 
their professed faith of Christianity—a so-called apostasy case. (I say “so-called” because 
in many of these cases the person seeking relief has never really professed and practiced 
Islam, but converted to Islam or was deemed Muslim for a variety of reasons, not always 
as a result of a sincere belief in the faith.)  
In that decision, the appeal was summarily dealt with and dismissed. The court ruled that 
the state Syariah courts had “implied” jurisdiction to determine if a person had left Islam, 
even though Sarawak state legislation did not expressly provide for apostasy applications 
to be made to the state Syariah courts. The apex court ruled therefore that the civil courts 
had no jurisdiction to deal with the applications.  
The reasoning is clearly flawed—the Federal Court in Indira Gandhi had made it clear 
that the Syariah courts could not derive jurisdiction by implication. A clear and express 
provision was required in the law before the civil courts could say they had no 
jurisdiction to hear a particular dispute. A simple application of the law the court had set 
out in Indira Gandhi just weeks before would have given the four applicants relief.  
Alas, no reasoned written grounds of judgment were ever given by the panel to explain 
this inconsistency. We are left with news reports about the decision, including these from 
the Borneo Post and Free Malaysia Today. And the applicants will continue to be dealt 
with as if they were Muslim, notwithstanding the religion they each actually profess. 
A Rocky Path Ahead 
In this contrast of judicial decisions, we see some of the problems faced when religion 
becomes entangled with the business of the state. This is set to continue despite the 
electoral tsunami in Malaysia after the Fourteenth General Elections on May 9, 2018, 
which saw Malaysia’s ruling coalition losing power at the federal level for the first time 
since independence in 1957.  
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The new government appointed non-Muslims to the powerful positions of attorney general 
and chief justice shortly after gaining power. This was lauded by proponents as a welcome 
move to meritocracy, but decried by opponents primarily on grounds of race and religion. 
Tensions continued with a massive rally cosponsored by the opposition Islamist party 
PAS and its former rival, UMNO, calling for a defense of Malay rights and the position 
of Islam. This was in opposition to the new government expressing its intention to accede 
to the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). 
Although many argued ICERD would not in any way detract from the role of Islam and 
the privileges ethnic Malays enjoyed in Malaysia, the government was embarrassingly 
forced to resile from their decision, succumbing to pressure not to appear to be against 
Islam.  
These developments in the political sphere also saw reverberations in the legal fraternity. 
For the first time, in Bar Council elections held at the height of the tensions regarding 
ICERD, a record number of Muslim lawyers who advocate for a greater role for Islam in 
governance were elected into office. Many of them had campaigned as a group, echoing 
the fallacious arguments that ICERD was a threat to Malaysia’s constitutional protections 
of Islam and Malay “rights.”  
Again, we see in action Moustafa’s acute observation of how pluralism, secularism, and 
liberalism are positioned in Malaysia as somehow inimical to Islam, when many would 
argue that this is not necessarily the case. These events show that the rights versus rites 
binary is set to continue for the time being, even in “new” Malaysia. 
Conclusion 
Constituting Religion is an immensely valuable work, as it shows the extent to which the 
Malaysian state apparatus has contributed to a warped conception of Islam amongst its 
adherents and places the court cases that have shaped the national discourse in its proper 
context. To me, it provides evidence for long-standing suspicions about how religion has 
been abused by an authoritarian state to impose control over its population. 
The perceptive analysis by Moustafa on our work as lawyers, in particular on the 
unintended consequences of what we think is “strategic” litigation, is a valuable addition 
to scholarship on public interest or cause lawyering. I have no doubt that lawyers from 
both sides of the divide will be religiously studying this book and formulating new 
strategies in how to advance their respective views on the place of Islam in governance in 
Malaysia. I understand a Malay translation of the work is in the pipeline, and I am greatly 
encouraged by this. The lessons gleaned from this valuable book must be shared to a 
wider audience in Malaysia.  
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Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “The Religion Trap” 
 
 
 
There is a trap in the study of religion and politics. All traditions are equally susceptible 
to it, but as Tamir Moustafa suggests in his new book, Constituting Religion, the 
temptation may be especially strong when it comes to contemporary state politics 
surrounding Islam and Islamic law. The trap is to conflate Islam as a fluid and diverse set 
of traditions with specific forms of state Islam and projects of Islamization. This 
conflation is so common that it can be difficult to see. After all, few Islamization projects 
present themselves as departing from the “real” Islam.  
Moustafa teaches us to avoid this trap. Malaysia has two parallel legal systems: one 
understood to be secular or civil and the other Islamic. This binary does not reflect a pre-
existing Malaysian religio-legal landscape: it constructs it. Describing the historical 
processes associated with the creation and entrenchment of this binary, as this book does, 
makes it possible to see that what constitutes “Islamic law” and who participates in 
“Islam” are simultaneously theological, legal, and political questions. Iza Hussin’s 
powerful book The Politics of Islamic Law also does this difficult yet crucial work. 
In Malaysia, there is a polarization between liberal rights and Islamic rites. The legal 
system continually breathes new life into this distinction, as religion is judicialized. This 
binary between rights and rites polices the boundaries of legal possibility and casts 
alternatives below the threshold of socio-legal legibility. It is not only a state project. 
NGOs, the media, advocacy groups, and ordinary citizens are all swept up in a legal and 
discursive storm. All perpetuate the binary.  
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Easily submerged in this tsunami of litigation and popular mobilization is the distinction 
between Islam and projects of state Islamization. Islam comprises a fluid set of traditions, 
of ways of being Muslim that are both contingent and coherent, which can be reduced to 
a single interpretation only through extraordinary interpretive license and, some would 
say, violence. Nowhere is this collapse more evident than in popular interpretations of 
Islam and Islamic law. A particular understanding of the latter has captured the 
Malaysian legal imaginary: 
The finding that most lay Muslims understand Islamic law as a legal code yielding only 
one correct answer to any given question is a testament to how the modern state, with its 
codified and uniform body of laws and procedures, has left its imprint on popular legal 
consciousness . . . Whereas Islamic jurisprudence is diverse and fluid, it is understood by 
most Malaysians as singular and fixed. Implementation of a codified version of Islamic 
law through the shariah courts is assumed to be a religious duty of the state. And, indeed, 
it appears that most Malaysians believe that the shariah courts apply God’s law directly, 
unmediated by human agency. 
All survey results are partial and over-simplified, but Moustafa’s are convincing in 
suggesting that this capture runs deep. The distinction between Islamic law, in all of its 
diversity and internal complexity, and specific state projects of Islamization has crumbled 
not only for scholars and public authorities but also in the eyes of ordinary Malaysians. 
This means that criticism of a legal initiative that is understood as “Islamic” is seen as an 
attack on Islam in general. As a result, conventional readings of Article 3(1) of the 
Malaysian Constitution (“Islam is the religion of the Federation”), which emphasize its 
ceremonial and symbolic meaning, are “not only pronounced unfaithful to the Federal 
Constitution; they are said to ‘challenge Islam’ itself.”  
Nowhere is the centripetal force of the religion trap more evident than in the landmark 
Lina Joy case. Joy, a Malay Muslim convert to Christianity, sought not to have her 
religion listed as Islam on her national identity card. But the Syariah Court refused to 
recognize her conversion out of Islam, and when the Federal Court rejected her appeal 
Joy fell into a jurisdictional abyss. In a nationwide survey conducted at the time, 96.5 
percent of Muslim respondents said that the Malaysian government should regulate 
apostasy because Islam forbids it. Faced with these statistics, many analysts would 
tumble head first into the religion trap, attributing the result to “Muslim intransigence” 
surrounding apostasy. Moustafa, to his credit, steps around the trap, concluding that 
“rather than drawing popular attention to the variety of possible positions concerning 
apostasy in the Islamic legal tradition, the polarized framing around the case appears to 
have strengthened a view that the state is obliged to prevent apostasy.”  
The conflation of a state-centric, racialized, and ethnicized set of legal interpretations of 
Islam (Malay=Muslim) with Islam in its entirety is troublesome. It renders certain forms 
of solidarity unimaginable, certain ways of relating unfathomable, and certain 
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understandings of both Islam and liberalism unthinkable. It sits at the troubled core of 
contemporary misunderstandings of religion and state in Malaysia and elsewhere. It 
shapes popular consciousness, media accounts, international advocacy, scholarly 
production, educational policy, and legal discourse. It closes off positions that defy the 
liberalism-Islam binary.  
It was not always this way. As one elderly ethnic Indian man told Moustafa, “Thirty-five 
years back, we didn’t have these issues. Everyone was happy. I went to school with the 
Chinese and Bumis. We really mingled around. There was no problem. But now come a 
lot of issues. They are segregating the people. It is government policy that they’re 
segregating us.”  
Moustafa suggests a way out of this impasse. Anglo-Muslim law, he explains, is not the 
“full and exclusive embodiment of the Islamic legal tradition.” Liberal secularism, too, is 
not an unchanging monolith that exists outside of particular legal and political contexts. 
Neither Islam nor liberalism exists as an autonomous, pure, or coherent formation. 
Rather, “binary forms emerge as a function of the institutional environment in which 
Islam and liberalism are represented.”  
Though perhaps underplayed by the author, there are important comparative applications 
of this argument. I read Constituting Religion while cruising the Nile as faculty host on a 
Northwestern alumni tour. It got me thinking about the situation in counterrevolutionary 
Egypt, where it has been over five years since Sisi declared the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) a terrorist group. Egypt has since been in the grips of what Atef Said calls “anti-
MB hysteria.” Conspiracy theories abound. One of our guides claimed that the 
Brotherhood is indistinguishable from ISIS and that former President Mursi was never 
elected. Another insisted that Mursi tried to give away the Sinai to the Palestinians and 
that tunnels full of terrorists linked Gaza and Egypt until Sisi blew them up. Emergency 
courts are jailing dissidents of all stripes on a daily basis. It is forbidden to celebrate the 
anniversary of the 2011 revolution. Posters praising Sisi adorn every dusty intersection 
and half-finished construction site.  
The repression extends beyond Egypt. In February of this year former New York Times 
Cairo bureau chief David Kirkpatrick was denied entry into Egypt and detained for seven 
hours incommunicado without food or water before being escorted to a London-bound 
plane without explanation. None of this is surprising given the Trump administration’s 
proud complicity in Sisi’s repression. American journalists and others are paying a price 
for a US administration that joins Sisi in celebrating the death of Egyptian politics, all 
politics, but perhaps especially those politics with an oppositional flavor designated as 
“Islamic.” 
In Sisi’s “with us or against us” mentality, opposing the regime makes one a disloyal 
Egyptian and a terrorist. On this violent landscape, the “moderate” Islam that is tolerated 
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is that which supports the regime. That state-sanctioned Islam, or so the regime hopes, 
will eventually extend its coercive reach to occupy all social, legal, and political spaces. 
It will encompass and stifle not only the MB but also a vast array of dissident Islams that 
support neither the MB nor the regime, as anthropologist Yasmin Moll explained 
compellingly after Mursi’s ouster. The religion trap tightens its grip. 
Anand Vivek Taneja is surely right that in the face of these developments one of our jobs 
as scholars is to “challenge and expand established ideas of what constitutes (and who 
participates) in the discursive tradition of Islam.” Moustafa’s nuanced account of the 
Malaysian legal and religious field helps us along this path by alerting us to a fatal trap in 
the study of religion and politics. The stakes are high. If we fail, the temptation to 
collapse Islam into a particular project of Islamization, Christianity into some version of 
Christian nationalism, or—as the debate rages over American support for Israel—
Judaism with a particular project of Zionism, may prove irresistible.  
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Benjamin Schonthal, “Why Religion is Different: Five Contradictions of 
Religion in Law” 
 
 
 
Tamir Moustafa’s Constituting Religion incisively reveals both the enduring and 
disturbing impacts of constitutional law on the ways Malaysians imagine and manage 
religion. It demonstrates how a constitutional system designed to protect Islam and 
guarantee religious freedom ended up undermining each while, at the same time, making 
the two goals appear incompatible. 
I am very persuaded by Moustafa’s arguments; and I have found similar dynamics at 
work in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, Moustafa’s book raises for me two questions about the 
broader links between law, religion, and social conflict, questions with which I have also 
struggled. First, precisely how blameworthy is law, itself, in these stories of acrimony 
and contestation? Don’t these disputes occur even in the absence of law? Second, why is 
religion special? Shouldn’t the dynamics of polarization and exacerbation, which 
Moustafa observes, happen with other legal rubrics as well?  
Moustafa is aware of these questions and he points to them in his conclusion. His 
response to the first is definitive. No, he insists, the “rites versus rights” binary could not 
have emerged in the absence of constitutions and courts because that binary depends 
upon notions of jurisdiction and authority that arise neither from Islam nor from liberal 
rights, themselves. Those binaries are produced, instead, by the legal “finger trap” of 
Article 121(1A) and its “radiating effects” in politics and the media.  
The second question—about whether religion is special—is harder to handle, and 
Moustafa’s book gives a less direct answer: religion is special, he argues, because of “the 
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multivocality and indeterminacy of religious traditions themselves” and the “instability” 
of religion as a category of law. This makes sense. Nevertheless, why precisely, is the 
“judicialization of religion” more problematic than the judicialization of other multivocal 
and unstable categories such as race, or custom, or culture? 
This question is vitally important for scholars because it flickers dimly in the background 
of so much academic writing on the legal regulation of religion. In this article, I want to 
add to Moustafa’s response: Yes, I will argue, religion does pose special challenges as a 
category of law; and these challenges arise not simply because religion is difficult, if not 
impossible, to define nor because legal agents deploy the category in strategic, 
prejudicial, or inconsistent ways. Religion is a uniquely thorny category of law, I will 
insist, because the use of that category—in legislatures, courtrooms, and mediascapes—
evokes (at least) five distinct discursive contradictions, opposing ways of representing 
and understanding those things that are supposed to be protected or regulated by law: 
contradictions of communality, authority, acquisition, imagination, and independence. 
I. Contradictions of Communality 
Striking in many of the cases that Moustafa describes is an ostensible clash between 
religious individuals and religious communities. On the one hand, these cases involve 
individuals seeking protection from the courts for their personal rights to observe or 
declare religion. On the other hand, they involve representatives of the “the Muslim 
community,” which (according to Malaysian case law) also has rights to uphold its own 
communal standards of entry and exit. Religious rights, as figured through the Malaysian 
legal system, therefore, apply not only to citizens but to groups. In fact, within the same 
article of the Malaysian Constitution (Article 11), sits subsection (1) guaranteeing “every 
person has the right to profess and practice his religion” and subsection (3) stating that 
“every religious group has the right to manage its own religious affairs.” 
Malaysia’s constitution is not unique in this regard. The constitutions of many 
countries—for example, India, South Africa, Singapore—include similar religious rights 
guarantees for both individuals and groups. Yet tensions between individualistic and 
communalistic understandings of religion are also seen in jurisdictions that prescribe no 
explicit group rights. Think, for example, of the rights conferred to “churches” under the 
US “ministerial exception” or UK marriage laws. 
This tension, in other words, is baked into many legal protections for religion, meaning 
that the judicialization of religion, wherever it may occur, has the tendency to set in 
motion contests between individual “religious” people and the communities they claim 
(or, in the Malaysian case, disavow) being part. For this reason, religious rights cases also 
lend themselves to political and social mobilization: because judicializing religion 
implicates religious communities, even when it is addressing individuals, it also serves as 
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an invitation for activists, clerical organizations, and others to represent those 
communities and advance claims in their name. 
II. Contradictions of Authority 
The tension between individual and community rights, described above, is not unique to 
religion. Similar tensions also appear in countries that grant rights and recognition to 
local customs, traditions, or indigenous laws. What happens, for example, when members 
of indigenous communities in Australia or Canada advance diverging interpretations of 
customary law? In most cases, federal courts make a group-based calculation: to the 
extent that the recognition of indigenous law is the (at least partial) recognition of 
indigenous sovereignty, state judges will tend to accept the fact that the interest of the 
groups (qua nations) outweigh those of the individuals. Those with greater status or rank 
in the group, such as an elder or chief, will therefore be granted greater authority by the 
state than less-senior members. 
What about in the case of religion? In the same way that rights to freedom of religion 
seem to empower both citizens and groups, so, too, do they seem to suggest both equality 
and inequality in the nature of claims made by them. As interpreted in most jurisdictions 
and in international law, religious rights are, at their core, rights to believe what one likes, 
analogous to (or a species of) rights to freedom of conscience. Understood in this way, 
claims to religious freedom ought not to be assessed according to their authenticity or 
accuracy (even if they are sometimes evaluated in terms of their sincerity). On the other 
hand, legal and popular understandings of rights to religious freedom also imagine those 
rights in ways similar to indigenous law: that is, they are rights to follow and maintain a 
separate normative system, along with its distinctive rules and obligations. Imagined in 
this second way—especially in cases involving exemptions and accommodations to 
general laws—religious rights appear to be rights to submit oneself to non-state structures 
of authority, structures which are not (by their very nature) reducible to or dependent on 
the beliefs of the individual.  
Built into religious rights, therefore, are contradictions of imagined authority. In courts 
and legislatures, religion appears, on the one hand, as a domain of dispersed or egalitarian 
authority, in which individuals alone determine the validity of their own religiosity, and, 
on the other hand, as a domain of hierarchical, structured power in which established 
texts and leaders have a greater say. This particular contradiction appears throughout 
Constituting Religion in the form of disputes between syariah court officials who, by 
virtue of their recognition by the state, are permitted to speak for Islam, and individual 
petitioners and civil society groups (such as Sisters in Islam) who speak as individual 
Muslims asserting their own power to study and interpret the faith. 
III. Contradictions of Acquisition 
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Also present in legal debates over religion are sharp divergences in how parties perceive 
and portray the acquisition of religion by individuals. Is religion something chosen 
willingly by persons or given to individuals by their families and communities? While 
this question pops up from time to time in court cases in the “secular” jurisdictions of 
North America and Europe, particularly in the context of children’s religious affiliations 
(as it relates to matters of schooling or custody), it comes up frequently in places like 
Malaysia or Sri Lanka, where one’s religious identity is determined by government 
officials at birth and recorded in official files. For the purposes of public education in Sri 
Lanka, for example, legislation requires that (under normal circumstances) students study 
their own religion for ordinary-level exams. Yet a student’s religion is determined not by 
his or her declaration, but by parents’ official religious identities. In contexts such as this, 
where religious affiliation is a predetermined part of one’s legal identity (or public 
education), asserting a right to religious freedom naturally brings to the fore a clash 
between the two ways of determining or acquiring a religion: choice and parentage. 
IV. Contradictions of Imagination 
One of the most fascinating cases in Constituting Religion is the Allah case, in which 
Malaysia’s higher judiciary upheld an order forbidding a Catholic newspaper from using 
the word “Allah” to refer to (the Christian) God. While the case brings up all kinds of 
interesting questions about speech, censorship, and property, it also highlights another 
fundamental tension that makes the legal regulation of religion so complex. Religion, as 
deployed in law, is something both abstract and concrete. Thus, when invoked in the 
context of courts and legislatures, religion generates certain contradictions of 
imagination: some litigants and jurists imagine religion as having a small footprint in the 
world consisting of “purely spiritual matters” such as salvation, morality, or ritual; others, 
however, imagine religion as having a much larger physical presence, consisting 
variously of objects such as communities, churches, properties, texts, and, perhaps, even 
words. According to this second imaginary, religion is not just something that can be 
professed or observed, but an object that can be acted upon and therefore saved, 
protected, rehabilitated, or transgressed. There are few basic constitutional rights that 
evoke similar imaginative splits. 
V. Contradictions of Independence  
Given all these other contradictions, it is perhaps unsurprising that lawyers and 
legislatures do not agree on the proper way to protect religion. But even if they could 
agree on how religion ought to be imagined, acquired, and authorized, the category of 
religion generates yet another discursive contradiction. This is because, in almost all 
jurisdictions, religious and legal elites imagine religion in its “liberated” condition as 
independent of the modern nation-state. Thus, as Moustafa skillfully points out, even in 
Malaysia, where Islam is highly regulated by the state, clerics and legal officials 
nonetheless speak and write about Islam as though it were (or should be) autonomous 
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from state power. The same could be said of religion in other jurisdictions. In the United 
States, for example, talk of disestablishment (or a wall of separation) is common in the 
very court decisions and legislation that limit what is considered normal, acceptable, or 
licit forms of religiosity. In this contradiction lies the most ultimate rub: when it comes to 
the legal management of religion, the very measures that are designed to ensure the 
independence or autonomy of religion (e.g. Art. 121[1A]) end up also compromising and 
undermining that autonomy because they require state institutions (e.g., syariah courts, 
civil courts, parliaments) to first determine the proper boundaries and representatives of 
the religion with which they are pledging not to interfere. This applies as much to 
religiously preferential legal regimes as to “secular” ones. 
These five discursive contradictions—and perhaps others—make the category of religion 
different from other categories of law. They work together and independently to make the 
legal regulation of religion uniquely challenging and troublesome. For this reason, the 
judicialization of religion has a greater likelihood of leading to tension, conflict, impasse 
and resentment than the judicialization of other legal categories such as race, custom, 
tradition, or language. Adding to all of this, and deepening the special challenges of 
religion as a category of law, is the fact that legal protections for religion are both more 
widespread and deeply entrenched than protections for categories such as custom or 
language: virtually all of the world’s basic laws mention religion and most of them treat 
religious freedom as a special or “core” type of right. All of this points even further to the 
broad importance and generalizability of Moustafa’s findings in Constituting Religion. 
This book is not just an important contribution to the study of Islam and Malaysia. It 
should be required reading for anyone interested in the dynamic entanglements of law 
and religion in the modern world. 
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Tamir Moustafa, “Constituting Religion – A Reply” 
 
 
The cover of my book Constituting Religion features an image from the Iranian artist 
Kiarash Yaghoubi. I came across Yaghoubi’s exquisite, untitled painting on a visit to the 
Islamic Arts Museum Malaysia. The museum holds the largest collection of Islamic art in 
Southeast Asia, brilliantly showcasing the beauty and diversity of fourteen centuries of 
Islamic civilization. 
Amidst this celebration of Islamic eclecticism, one could easily miss the irony that was 
more subtly on display: If Yaghoubi were to visit Malaysia, he would not be able to 
practice Shia religious rites. To be clear, I know nothing of Yaghoubi’s religious practice 
and sensibilities, but it is a fact that Shia Islam is designated as a “deviant” faith in 
Malaysia. Indeed, state authorities criminalize dozens of so-called deviant religious 
practices, whilst mandating a state-sanctioned Islamic orthodoxy. (This recently came to 
the attention of over two hundred Iraqi nationals who were arrested for participating in a 
Shia religious ceremony to commemorate Ashura.) 
In contrast with the legal straitjacket on religious practice in contemporary Malaysia, 
Yaghoubi’s artwork suggests the nearly limitless forms that any religious tradition can 
assume. The jumble of letters, stylized in Islamic calligraphy, is to me a metaphor for the 
myriad ideational formulations that are possible when these letters are alternately 
arranged to produce different words, phrases, texts, and meanings. Religious practice and 
understandings will always be diverse, complex, fluid, and contested, despite the wishes 
of a jurispathic state. 
One of the meta-themes of Constituting Religion is how state efforts to define, regulate, 
and administer Anglo-Muslim law generate new legal questions and conundrums; 
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provide continuous fodder for activists; and serve as rocket-fuel for countervailing social 
movements. These developments in turn shape new understandings of religion—and not 
only for self-identified Muslims. 
* * * 
I want to thank everyone who contributed to this forum, along with the editor of The 
Immanent Frame, Mona Oraby, who made all of this possible. It is an honor to have the 
sustained attention of so many impressive scholars from across so many different 
disciplines. From the start, this project was both exhilarating and humbling because the 
co-constitutive dynamics of law, religion, politics, and society are so complex. These 
essays—along with many conversations that I have had with many of the contributors 
over the years—have deepened my understanding and have helped me to see how this 
project is viewed from diverse disciplinary vantage points. 
Asli Bâli’s contribution captures many of my core arguments concerning the link 
between institutional design, judicialization, and the radiating effects of law and courts on 
politics and religious consciousness. No doubt, her important book with Hanna Lerner, 
Constitution Writing, Religion and Democracy, attunes her to the inextricable links 
between judicial institutions and their radiating effects. Kristen Stilt’s essay provides 
more details on the political anxieties that are wrapped up in Malaysia’s demographic 
balance, both historically and right up to the present moment. Matthew Nelson’s detailed 
commentary alerts us to the ways that these issues have traveled, both historically and 
geographically, in the vein of Iza Hussin’s important work. And Patricia Sloane-White 
provides an eye-opening view onto what she sees as a deepening of a zero-sum binary by 
way of the otherwise celebrated Islamic banking and finance industries. 
Given the space limitations for this response, I will focus the bulk of my reflections on 
the remaining essays. It is a particular honor that Shanmuga Kanesalingam contributed to 
this forum with his firsthand analysis of the Indira Gandhi case. It is hard to overstate the 
formative role that Shanmuga has played in cause lawyering when it comes to matters of 
religious freedom in Malaysia. For me, his participation in this forum is a reminder of 
how important it is for those activists who we write about to have the opportunity to 
respond and engage with our scholarship. It is important that his voice is heard directly, 
unmediated by my own writing and analysis. In retrospect, I realize that this was a missed 
opportunity to also invite one of Shanmuga’s legal adversaries to join us for this 
exchange. Throughout my fieldwork, I always found it easier to relate to the views and 
positions of liberal rights lawyers and activists like Shanmuga. Yet I was mindful that a 
better understanding of the aims, concerns, and anxieties of conservative activists and 
their audiences is essential for a deeper appreciation of the complexity of the legal 
entanglements and their polarizing effects on popular consciousness. 
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Winnifred Sullivan raises important questions about whether “the efforts of legal and 
religious historians, sociologists and anthropologists to describe the effects of modern 
law on religion” are, in their own way, forms of “mansplaining religion.” While my own 
liberal inclinations may come through in passages of Constituting Religion, my principal 
aim is not to advocate for one side or another, but rather to examine the politics of 
claims-making by the government, the courts, advocacy groups, the religious 
establishment, and everyday citizens. Nonetheless, I agree with Sullivan that to write on 
law and religion is to navigate a minefield, whether one recognizes it or not. To use 
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd’s metaphor, it is as important as it is challenging to avoid “the 
religion trap” that would have us define, authorize, and reify alternate visions of religion 
that are used to advance political projects. Doing so may serve to “stabilize religion in the 
service of liberal norms” as Sullivan points out. Worse still (at least in my view) is when 
religion is stabilized in the service of authoritarianism. Hurd nicely illustrates this with 
the example of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s despotic rule in Egypt. Whether in Egypt or 
Malaysia, the construction of a “secular” versus “religious” cleavage (or “good religion” 
versus “bad religion”) can be a powerful device to advance authoritarian projects. 
Ironically, the charge of mansplaining religion is one that the Malaysian women’s 
advocacy group Sisters in Islam faces regularly, albeit not with that specific turn of 
phrase. Sisters in Islam pushes for women’s rights from within the Islamic legal tradition 
rather than against it. Nonetheless, they are frequently chastised for challenging “God’s 
law.” Their rejoinder is a powerful one: if Islam is invoked as the basis of public policy, 
then they, too, have the right to speak on Islam. This is a position that I respect 
wholeheartedly. As Shanmuga briefly references, I have shared my concern that many of 
the tactics liberal activists embrace (litigation, press campaigns, bringing foreign pressure 
to bear) risk reinforcing a counterproductive narrative that religion is under siege. The 
“within the tradition” approach of Sisters in Islam is perhaps best able to deactivate these 
binary constructions, even if it might be considered liberal mansplaining by some of their 
detractors. 
Let me move now to address Jaclyn Neo’s concern that the book gave “short shrift” to 
matters of race and language. I am in full agreement with Neo that both race and 
language are crucially important in the construction of Malaysia’s constitutional identity. 
This is why a discussion of race informs every empirical chapter of the book, beginning 
with the legal formulation of race in British Malaya, to the discussion of how race-based 
politics gave rise to Article 3 (and others) in the Federal Constitution, to the variety of 
ways that religion is continually invoked in court and by social movements to advance 
notions of racial supremacy. The suggestion that “he could have also engaged with the 
choice of language in judicial decisions” is also puzzling. Neo provides the Lina Joy case 
as an example where language is used to communicate and construct constitutional 
identity, yet the choice of language (in the Lina Joy decision and others) is examined in 
the book in precisely this way. In my discussion of the Lina Joy case, for example, I note 
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that: “The decision provides a clear illustration of how law and the social imaginary 
conflate Malay racial and religious identity in contemporary Malaysia. In fact, it is worth 
noting that the majority opinion in Lina Joy was written in Bahasa Malaysia and not in 
English, as is conventional practice. This departure from standard convention was surely 
meant to deliver the message that matters concerning Islam and Malay identity are first 
and foremost Malay issues, as opposed to Malaysian issues” (p. 75). 
  
In keeping with a decentered analysis of law, Constituting Religion also strives to 
underline the importance of language by comparing press coverage of court cases across 
Malaysia’s diverse media landscape, from the Malay-language newspapers Utusan 
Malaysia, Berita Harian, and Harakah, to the Tamil-language papers Makkal Osai and 
Malaysia Nanban, to the Chinese-language Sin Chew, and the English-language press. 
These comparisons suggest the extent to which Malaysia’s segmented ethnolinguistic 
media environment further refracts competing frames of understanding across 
ethnolinguistic groups. Neo’s instinct is correct that one of the challenges of writing this 
book was to do justice to the specificities and complexities of the Malaysian case, whilst 
pursuing a more general theory-building agenda. My earnest hope is that readers who are 
motivated by one or the other of these objectives will each find the analysis enriching. 
Benjamin Schonthal’s contribution to this forum is characteristically sharp. He has taken 
some of the core observations that are presented in Constituting Religion, compared them 
against his own hard-earned insights on modern law and religion in Sri Lanka and 
elsewhere, and rendered these insights into lucid corollaries that address the question, 
“Why is religion different?” To be clear, this is not the question that I pose in the 
concluding chapter of the book, which is more along the lines of “Does law matter? (And 
if so, how?)” In any case, the book presents dozens of thorny examples that underline the 
instability (and contradictions) of religion as an object of law. 
One of the well-known cases examined at length in the book is that of Lina Joy v. 
Religious Council of the Federal Territories. In litigating Joy’s right to religious freedom, 
her attorneys argued that restrictions on conversion violated her right to religious 
freedom, a right enshrined in Article 11 of the Malaysian Constitution, which states (in 
part) that “Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion . . .” [emphasis 
added]. However, Joy’s opponents invoked another clause from the same Article, which 
states, “Every religious group has the right . . . to manage its own religious affairs . . .” 
[emphasis added]. This second set of attorneys also claimed the right to religious 
freedom, but they argued that Article 11 safeguards the ability of religious groups to craft 
their own rules and regulations (including rules of entry and exit) free from outside 
interference. Ironically, advocates on both sides of the controversy invoked “religious 
freedom.” Both sides grounded their claims in constitutional texts. And both sides called 
upon the state to secure their contrasting visions of Malaysian state and society. In this 
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single case, we can see all five contradictions that Schonthal enumerates (communality, 
authority, acquisition, imagination, and independence) at play, and all at once. 
Whether “religion is different” and functions as a special object of law, with specific 
contradictions that are not shared by other categories such as race, custom, or culture, is a 
good question. It is also one that I am not presently equipped to answer with any degree 
of sophistication. Another way of approaching the question, however, is to affirm that 
religion does not operate as a solitary or stable category. Instead, religion is intertwined 
with other categories of identity and meaning, and it is always shaped by the push and 
pull of politics, society, and state. In Malaysia, this has meant that when questions around 
religion emerge in court, issues and anxieties around race often go hand in hand. This 
intertwining also means that religion is frequently employed as a proxy to advance other 
overlapping identities. So, litigation in pursuit of religious supremacy is often equally an 
effort to advance an agenda of racial supremacy. 
Regardless of the contradictions that may distinguish religion as a special category of 
law, we must keep our eyes trained on variation in legal institutions. Constituting 
Religion endeavors to demonstrate how certain legal configurations exacerbate these 
contradictions. What may appear as conflict arising from the unique properties of religion 
as an object of law can often be traced back to specific legal configurations that hardwire 
and amplify these contradictions (e.g., Malaysia’s bifurcated judiciary, pluri-legal family 
law provisions, etc.). Recognizing problematic configurations of state law provides some 
hope that law and legal institutions might someday be reformed to mitigate conflict. Yet, 
as I elaborate in the book, fundamental institutional changes are unlikely due to political 
gridlock. In the meantime, perhaps the best we can do is to be clear about the source of 
the problem, which has little to do with religion (as a practice of faith) and far more to do 
with the regulation of religion (as a state project). 
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